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Will nobody defend judicial supremacy anymore?'
"[A] permanent and indispensablefeature of our constitutionalsystem" is
that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution."2

INTRODUCTION

Judicial supremacy is alive and well in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The concept that the Supreme Court is the ultimate, and in some
cases exclusive, interpreter of the Constitution flourished in the
1990s. 3 Correspondingly, across a broad range of legal doctrine, federal judicial deference to the constitutional interpretation of other
branches of government declined markedly. In 1999, this trend accelerated. F/ohida PrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,4 announced on the final day of the Court's 1998 Term,
provides particularly compelling evidence of diminished judicial deference. Provisions of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments specifically confer enforcement powers on Congress. 5
Accordingly, these enforcement clauses long have constituted an area
of substantial judicial deference to the constitutional judgments of
Congress. Florida Prepaid, however, announced a new and limiting
construction of Congress's enforcement powers. 6
FloridaPrepaidserves simply as the latest and most visible manifestation of the new judicial supremacy. A series of Supreme Court cases
over the past ten years has traced a similar pattern in subjects including the scope of the federal commerce power, the implied limits that
federalism places on the exercise of federal authority, the political
question doctrine, and the appropriate level of judicial deference to
administrative agencies. New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse's
characterization of the Supreme Court's last Term actually captures a
1 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantismand ComparativeCompetence: A Reply to Professors
Levinson and Eisgruber,83 GEo. L.J. 385, 385 (1994).
2 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922-23 (1995) (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 18 (1958)).
3 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (refusing to defer to Congress's determination of the need to legislate to protect rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 54Y (1995) (refusing to defer to Congress's
interpretation of interstate commerce); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)

(refusing to defer to Congress's determination of the need to impose regulatory obligations on states). These cases are discussed infra Part II.
4 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article

by appropriate legislation."); id. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); id. amend. XV, § 2 ("The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
6 For a discussion of orida Prepaid,see infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
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much broader trend in recent federal jurisprudence: "The Supreme
7
Court rules."
Two significant court of appeals decisions from 1999 demonstrate
that this decline in deference is radiating into the lower courts as well.
In American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA,8 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinvigoratedjudicial scrutiny of congressional delegation of administrative authority. This decision may herald a revival
of the nondelegation doctrine, which has lain dormant for half a century. Another marker of diminished deference, despite its ultimate
holding, is the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Dickerson.9 In Dickerson, the court held that
Congress had effectively overruled Mirandav. Arizona' ° by enacting 18
U.S.C. § 3501.11 The holding is surprising, but the reasoning even
more so. Rather than deferring to the constitutional judgments of
Congress, the court reached its decision by expressing disdain for the
interpretive powers of both Congress and the President. 12 In rejecting deference to Congress, the President, and the Supreme
Court's holding in Miranda, the case is literally unprecedented.
Even as judicial supremacy gains ascendancy in the courts, its star
is on the decline in the legal academy. The theory that Congress and
the President have the ability, indeed the obligation, to engage in constitutional interpretation independent of the Judiciary has achieved a
status of accepted dogma. Dissenters remain, 13 but the focus of the
debate has turned to the scope, not the existence, of the independent
role of the Executive and the Legislature in interpreting the Constitution. The implications of the coordinacy theory for the question of
judicial deference, however, have not been fully appreciated. One
commentator has accurately described the question of the Judiciary's
deference to the constitutional interpretation of the other two
branches of government as "perhaps the central question" of constitutional adjudication. 14 Coordinacy has important and unexplored
ramifications for this central question.
The relationship between coordinacy and judicial deference is
complex. Acknowledging the constitutional competence of other
branches of government does not necessarily entail judicial deference
7
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court: The JusticesDecide Who's in Charge, N.Y. TMES,
June 27, 1999, § 4, at 1.
8 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
9 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
10 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11 See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 687.
12 For a discussion of Dickerson, see infra Part II.E.
13
See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1997) (defendingjudicial supremacy).
14 Edward A- Hartnett, A Matter ofJudgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
123, 156 (1999).
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to their constitutional conclusions. Indeed, coordinacy is in tension
with notions of absolute judicial deference to Congress or the President. Coordinacy does not substitute legislative supremacy or executive supremacy for judicial supremacy. Recognizing the interpretive
role of the Legislature and the Executive, however, does undermine
the strong position of judicial supremacy exhibited in recent federal
court opinions. Judicial supremacy affords a simple, pervasive, and
consistently negative answer to the question of deference to other
branches. Recent Supreme Court cases limiting congressional power
illustrate the implications of this theory. Coordinacy requires a revised approach.
This Article offers a new framework for addressing the issue of
deference that incorporates the insights of the coordinacy/supremacy
debate. This approach draws on the insights of the academic rejection of judicial supremacy, but also seeks to expand the range of discussion to include state courts. Current theories of coordinacy and
deference in constitutional interpretation focus solely on the federal
Constitution. Consideration of state court interpretation of state constitutions offers an important additional dimension. Unlike federal
courts, state courts generally do defer to the constitutional judgments
of other branches of government. The state experience thus stands in
marked contrast to the federal experience and offers a valuable alternative perspective. The goal of this Article is to construct an account
of deference to guide the practice of both state and federal courts.
Through an analysis of state and federal judicial decisions across
a broad range of doctrinal areas, this Article argues that current standards of judicial review reflect basic commitments to certain postulates of political philosophy. State court deference corresponds to the
concept of a state government of plenary power; federal courts resist
deference based on a concept of the limited power of the national
government. Having identified the theory of deference that underlies
contemporary practice, this Article offers a critique of that approach
and of the current case law that embodies it. I criticize the foundationalist premises of the theory, arguing that they present an oversimplified and monologic understanding of our constitutional traditions.
State and federal constitutions cannot be reduced to a single dominant political principle, because American constitutional practice has
been more complex and polyphonic. The foundationalist theory and
the judicial decisions that it guides ignore this story of constitutional
diversity. As a result, state and federal courts adopt insufficiently
nuanced approaches to the question of deference. In brief, in a variety of areas, federal courts defer too little and state courts defer too
much. The resulting constitutional practice is impoverished and not

CORNELL LAW REViEW

[Vol. 85:656

sufficiently attuned to the positive role of government in realizing
constitutional values.
In place of this foundationalist theory, this Article offers a more
pragmatic and contextual approach to the question of deference.
Both the principle of interpretive coordinacy and the realities of the
modem state demand an appreciation of the crucial role of legislatures in promoting constitutional principles. As the New Deal illustrated, legislative inaction may prove more pernicious than legislative
action. 15 A pragmatic theory recognizes the mandate for legislative
action and calibrates the appropriate level of deference to the need
for legislative participation in the realization of constitutional norms.
State and federal constitutional provisions may manifest faith in legislatures, fear of legislative action, or fear of legislative inaction. These
different kinds of constitutional concerns require different degrees of
judicial deference. Rather than relying on ossified postulates of enumerated federal power or plenary state power, this Article develops a
principle of deference that responds to the varying constitutional re16
sponsibilities of legislatures in the modem state.
Part I examines the dominance of coordinacy over judicial
supremacy in debates about constitutional interpretation and explores the relevance of coordinacy to theories of judicial deference.
Part II describes the proclamations of judicial supremacy and the rejection of deference characteristic of current federal court practice.
By reviewing the decline of deference in several doctrinal areas, this
Part demonstrates how the emphasis on limiting the powers of the
national government drives the resistance to judicial deference. Part
III explores how the contrasting principle of plenary state governmental power leads state courts to maintain a deferential standard ofjudicial review. Part IV analyzes alternative accounts ofjudicial deference
based on text, institutional competence, and democratic deliberation
and contends that they cannot offer satisfactory approaches to determining the appropriate standard for judicial review. Part V explores
the underlying premises of the foundationalist account of deference
and explains how the theory misrepresents the diversity of our constitutional traditions. Building on principles of interpretive coordinacy,
I then develop a new, pragmatic approach to deference that facilitates

15

See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, ConstitutionalTheory Transformed, 108 YALE LJ. 2115,

2130 (1999); Cass R_ Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal 101 HR~v. L. REv. 421,
501-04 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constitutionalism];Cass K. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency
InactionAfter Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653, 683 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Agency Inaction].
16 This Article focuses primarily on the interaction of courts and legislatures, but the
basic principles it develops also apply to the relationship between courts and the executive
branch.
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the crucial role of legislatures in realizing constitutional values in the
modem state.
I
SupREMAcy, CooRDNACY, AND DEFERENCE

This Part sketches the key concepts that underlie this Article's
exploration of recent trends in judicial decision making. I outline the
concepts ofjudicial supremacy, coordinacy, and deference and discuss
the relationship among the three.
A.

Supreme Court Proclamations of Supremacy

The theory of judicial supremacy posits the U.S. Supreme Court
as the single, authoritative interpreter of the U.S. Constitution. 17 According to this view, the Constitution means only what the Supreme
Court says it does. Other branches of government and the citizenry at
large may have opinions about constitutional meaning, but the Court
has a privileged role in constitutional interpretation. Supreme Court
rulings thus define the content of the Constitution. No difference
exists between the Constitution and constitutional law as developed by
the Supreme Court. Judicial precedents are every bit as binding and
authoritative as the text of the Constitution itself.
The Supreme Court's most famous use of the rhetoric ofjudicial
supremacy was in Cooperv. Aaron.'8 In Cooper, the Governor of Arkansas defied the desegregation orders of the federal courts. Governor
Faubus sought to justify his stance by asserting the right of the state to
interpret the Constitution independently of the Supreme Court. In
response to Governor Faubus's challenge, the Court proclaimed:
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, ChiefJustice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the notable case of Marbuty v. Madison that "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." This
decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law
17 See Scott E. Gant, JudicialSupremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretationof the Constitution,
24 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 359, 367-68 (1997) (discussing characteristics of judicial
supremacy).
18 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ....19
The Court has repeated claims to supremacy in a variety of cases following Cooper.20 Recently, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,21 the Court
again spoke in the accents ofjudicial supremacy. 2 2 The theory places
the Supreme Court at the apex of a pyramid that encompasses all
other government officials. Consequently, Supreme Court rulings
bind other branches of government just as they bind lower courts.
B.

Coordinacy v. Supremacy

While the rhetoric ofjudicial supremacy appears in judicial opinions, much academic commentary rejects the concept, emphasizing
the independent role of the President and of Congress in interpreting
the Constitution.23 Indeed, one of the chief advocates of a robust role
for executive interpretation of the Constitution has expressed some
dismay at the absence of scholarly sparring partners, inquiring, "Will
nobody defend judicial supremacy anymore?" 24 In the place of judicial supremacy, these commentators insist on coordinate roles for the
President and Congress in constitutional interpretation.
The coordinacy theory rests on the premise that within our constitutional system, each branch has an independent obligation to interpret the Constitution. This independent obligation derives from
the constitutional system of separation of powers. 25 The oath to "support this Constitution,12 6 an oath constitutionally mandated not only
for judges but also for all state and federal legislators and executive
officials, evidences this independent obligation. 2 7 Under the coor19

Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
21 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22 See id. at 868; see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to ProfessorPaulsen,83 GEo. LJ. 347, 347 (1994) (describing Casey as treatingjudicial
supremacy "as a defining characteristic of the American people and their ideals").
23 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, JudicialExclusivity and PoliticalInstability,84 VA. L.
REv. 83 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905
(1989-1990); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch:Executive Power to Say What
the Law Is, 83 GEo. LJ.217 (1994). Even commentators who question some of the more
extreme implications drawn from the concept of coordinate interpretation do not dispute
the basic notion that the executive and legislative branches have an independent role in
interpreting the Constitution. See Eisgruber, supra note 22; Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalProtestantismin Theory and Practice: Two Questionsfor Michael Stokes Paulsen and Onefor
His Critics, 83 GEo. LJ. 373, 373-74 (1994).
24
Paulsen, supra note 1, at 385.
25 See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 241-57.
26 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
27 See id. ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
20
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dinacy theory, a distinction exists between the Constitution and the
judicial construction of the Constitution. The Judiciary is not the exclusive oracle of constitutional meaning. Other branches may interpret the Constitution independently of the Judiciary.
Many questions of theoretical interest turn on the distinction between supremacy and coordinacy. What should we think of a President who says the following: "I believe that this legislation represents
good policy, and the Supreme Court has indicated that it believes the
legislation is constitutional. However, though I wish I agreed with the
Court in this conclusion, I do not. I find that the law is unconstitutional, and therefore I must veto it or pardon anyone who violates it."
Is this President a constitutional hero or constitutional fool?28 In cer-

tain instances, as when executive decisions are not subject to judicial
review, the issue of independent interpretive authority may have practical significance.2 9 However, because so many relevant executive decisions are either wholly discretionary, such as the veto and pardon,3 0
or eventually subject to judicial review, the coordinacy/supremacy debate will generally not have a dispositive effect on matters of public
policy.3 1 Assuming that, pace Governor Faubus, the Executive must
comply with judicial judgments in cases to which it is a party,3 2 the
distinction between a mere judicial opinion and a binding judicial determination is merely a matter of time. Even if the Court's view of the
Constitution is not theoretically supreme, its interpretation will evenConstitution .... ."); Paulsen, supra note 23, at 257-62. The Constitution further dictates
that the President take an oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
28
See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 245 (1976) (discussing the obligation of the Executive to veto unconstitutional legislation, even if courts
would uphold the enactment).
29
See David A. Strauss, PresidentialInterpretationof the Constitution, 15 CApDozo L. REv.
113, 115-16 (1993).
30 We now generally accept the fact that the President may veto legislation or exercise
the pardon power to further policy preferences, not just to prevent unconstitutional usurpation. See Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 909. The Framers, by contrast, created the veto
mainly as a means of negating unconstitutional legislation. See id. at 907-08; Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century Pridency in a Twent,-First Century Worl, 48 AR. L. REv. 1, 9
(1995).
31
Cf ALEXIS DE TOcQUE VLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969)
("There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later
turn into ajudicial one.").
32 Professor Paulsen is one of the few to assert that the President can ignore ajudgment issued in a particular case. See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 221-22. However, even he
acknowledges that such defiance should be extremely rare. See id. at 332-42 (discussing
principles of executive deference, accommodation, and restraint); see also Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 81 IowA L. REv.
1267, 1325 (1996) ("[A]lthough we do not have supreme confidence in our answer, we
conclude that the best understanding of the role of judgments in the constitutional
scheme is that the President and Congress can refuse to enforce a judgment only in extreme circumstances .. ").
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tually become embodied in a judicial judgment that will bind other
branches of government.3 3 Thus, when Attorney General Edwin
Meese dared to criticize judicial supremacy, 3 4 he provoked public out36
cry and academic debate, 35 but no constitutional crisis.
C. Judicial Deference to Constitutional Interpretation by Other
Branches
The question whether other branches must follow judicial interpretations of the Constitution that are not embodied in binding judgments thus raises fascinating theoretical issues of occasional practical
import. By contrast, the degree of deference that the Judiciary owes
to the interpretations of other branches of government is a matter of
tremendous significance across a broad range of legal doctrine.3 7 The
question really concerns the scope of judicial review. In examining
the validity of particular governmental actions, should the courts exercise wholly independent judgment, or should they offer some level of
deference to the constitutional judgments of other branches? The answer to this question defines the role of the Judiciary in addressing pressing public issues. The answer reflects
the difference between Lochner v. New YorkP8 and West Coast

33
See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as BindingLaw and as ExplanationsforJudgments, 15 CAunozo L. REv. 43, 71-72 (1993).
34 See Lawson & Moore, supra note 32, at 1268; Edwin Meese JI1, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987) (reprinting Attorney General Meese's speech).
35 See Symposium, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL.

L. REv. 977 (1987).
36 Perhaps the greatest controversy that assertions of the Executive's power to make
independent constitutional interpretations generated concerned the Reagan Administration's refusal to enforce certain provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act. See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 268-72; cf Murray Waas & Jeffrey Toobin, Meese's Power Grab: The

Constitutional Crisis No One Noticed, NEw REPuBUc, May 19, 1986, at 15 ("[U]ntil Ronald

Reagan, no president has ever asserted the right to ignore a law he thinks is unconstitutional, let alone the right to defy a court ruling that a law is constitutional just because he
happens to disagree.").
37
See Hartnett, supranote 14, at 156.
38 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state statute setting maximum labor hours for
bakery and confectionery establishment employees). Although the Court in Lochner sometimes employed the language of reasonableness, it showed no interest in deferring to the
Legislature's assessment of social reality:
We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this
case. There is, in ourjudgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this
to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public
health or the health of the individuals who are following the trade of a
baker.
Id. at 58.
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Hotel Co. v. Parrish,39 between Plessy v. Ferguson4 ° and Loving v.
Virginia.4 1
A strong view ofjudicial supremacy implies an absence ofjudicial
deference. If constitutional interpretation is the special preserve of
the Judiciary, and the constitutional role of the Court is privileged
and unique, then the Court has no reason to afford special significance to the constitutional judgments of Congress or the President.
Accordingly, the courts would err in deferring to the views of other
branches. Such deference would amount to abdication of the constitutional responsibility to declare the meaning of the Constitution.
The coordinacy argument, by contrast, provides for the possibility
of judicial deference. Coordinacy recognizes that Congress and the
President also have an obligation to interpret the Constitution. Congressional or presidential interpretation of the Constitution thus does
not represent impudence or attempted usurpation, but rather the discharge of a constitutionally imposed duty. Judicial deference acknowledges that, based on the interpretation of another branch of
government, a court might arrive at a conclusion different from one it
would otherwise reach. Indeed, deference only has meaning if the
court addressing the matter independently would reach a conclusion
different from that of the Executive or the Legislature. 42 In this sense,
deference implies difference. 43 Coordinacy, though, can tolerate disa39

300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage law for women). The Court

noted:
[T]imes without number we have said that the legislature is primarily the
judge of the necessity of such an enactment, that every possible presumpdon is in favor of its validity, and that though the court may hold views
inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power.
Id. at 398 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
40
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state law mandating racial segregation in railroad
cars), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court approached
the issue in Pessy as follows: "So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is
concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion
on the part of the legislature." Id. at 550.
41
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding unconstitutional the state legislation banning interracial
marriage). The Court stated: "[W]e do not accept the State's contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational
purpose." Id. at 8.
42
See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the AdministrativeState, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5
(1983) (discussing deference as involving a displacement of the interpretation that a court
otherwise would have reached).
43 Jacques Derrida's meditations on the interplay between difference and deference
led him to create the term "diffgrance,"JAcQuEs DERRIDA, Diffirance,in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 3 (Alan Bass trans., 1982), which has been rendered as "difference-differing-deferring,"
SeeJONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCrION: THEORY AND CRrcisSM AFrER STRUCrrURALISM

97 (1982).
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greement. Judicial supremacy responds to the perceived need for a
single authoritative interpretation, and therefore a single authoritative interpreter.44 Within this framework, deference constitutes dissonance, a distraction from the single, proper voice. Coordinacy
recognizes a plurality of authorized voices and views deference as an
acceptable, even desirable accommodation to this constitutional polyphony.45 Many matters end up in court, but the fact ofjudicial review
does not entail ignoring preceding constitutional judgments by other
branches of government.
Coordinacy does not, however, mandate complete judicial deference. The recognition of an independent interpretive role for Congress and the President does not imply judicial dependence on
nonjudicial constitutional interpretations. On the contrary, the case
for independent executive and legislative interpretation builds on the
case for independent judicial interpretation. 46 Coordinacy merely
recognizes the voices of Congress and the President; it does not silence the Judiciary. The theory does not replace judicial supremacy
with legislative or executive supremacy. The Court's decision in Marbuy v. Madison4 7 furnishes strong support for the idea that courts are
not constitutionally bound to follow the constitutional interpretations
of other branches of government. Both in holding a section of the
Judiciary Act unconstitutional and in showing a willingness to review
the legality of executive action (if jurisdiction were constitutionally
permitted),48 the Court in Marbuy created an independent role for
the Judiciary in deciding constitutional questions. Academic supporters of coordinacy agree that Marbury gives the Judiciary an independent voice; they simply wish to extend the gift of Marbury to other
branches. 49
44 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer provide an extended argument for judicial
supremacy based on the need for an "authoritative interpreter[ ]" of the Constitution. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 13, at 1359.
45
Polyphony may also result from an interplay between state and federal interpretive
voices. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism:State Constitutions in the Federal Courts,
87 CAL. L. REv. 1409 (1999).
46 See Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 919-20 (noting ChiefJustice Marshall's rejection
ofjudicial deference in Marbury and characterizing his approach to judicial review as premised on the theory of "[e]very man for himself' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47
48

49

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

See id. at 173-80.
For example, Professor Paulsen states:
I emphatically reject the view, which sometimes travels under the name of
deference, that an interpreter (typically, a judge) should reach a conclu-

sion different from the one produced by her best legal analysis, or should
refrain from reaching any conclusion at all, because of the views of another.
While an interpreter may be persuaded or influenced in the exercise of her
own judgment by the views and reasoning of another, any theory that accords decision-altering weight to the views of another, contrary to the interpreter's settled conviction as to the proper interpretation of the provision
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Coordinacy provides a strong case against what might be called
legal deference, the view that the courts are legally bound to accept
the constitutional judgments of others.5 0 Coordinacy, however, can
accept the more pragmatic notion that, in certain instances, courts
can better serve the constitutional design by crediting the determinations of other branches. 51 The coordinacy thesis is quite compatible
with a judicial deference that accommodates the views of other
52
branches, while not amounting to an abdication of judicial review.
Marbury does not contradict the principle that, in some instances, a
court exercising its independent judgment should nevertheless give
great weight to the constitutional judgments of other governmental
actors. 53 Marbury establishes the principle ofjudicial review, but does
not demarcate the scope of its exercise. 54 Contrary to the implications of some recent Supreme Court pronouncements, 5 5 Marbury in
no way rejects deferential review.
at issue, is fundamentally illegitimate. I am thus deeply skeptical of doctrines of pseudo-deference such as the political question doctrine and stare
decisis.
Paulsen, supra note 23, at 336 n.413; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power
and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,15 CAuDozo L. REv 81, 108
(1993) (questioning the propriety of "automatically deferring" to constitutional views of
other branches of government).
50 Lawson & Moore, supranote 32, at 1271.
51 See id. at 1274-79. Lawson and Moore employ the term "epistemological deference"
to describe the practice of accepting the judgments of others because, all things considered, these judgments likely provide the best guides in the search for truth. Id. at 1271. I
avoid this term because I am not convinced that constitutional interpretation is best conceived as an epistemological process of seeking the single correct meaning.
52 See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 332 ("In a system of coordinate interpretive power,
each branch should be guided in the exercise of its independent interpretation by a principle of deference to the considered views of the other branches, and by a responsibility of
reasonable accommodation of its independent views to those of the others." (emphasis
omitted)); see also Hartnett, supra note 14, at 154-58 (defending the importance of deference by the Judiciary and other branches); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REV. 153, 187 (1997) ("[Wghen
Congress has addressed and resolved a constitutional question, the Court should not overturn that interpretation without a powerful justification.").
53 See Eisgruber, supra note 22, at 349-51; Lawson & Moore, supra note 32, at 1274
("[T]o say that federal courts have the power, or duty, to interpret the Constitution is not
necessarily to say that they have the power to interpret it independently of the views of other
governmental actors."). Similarly, Professor Monaghan notes:
[T]hejudicial duty "to say what the law is" is analytically empty. The judicial
duty to decide demands nothing with respect to the scope ofjudicial review;
it is, therefore, entirely consistent with such propositions as, "the Constitution means what Congress says it means, so long as the congressional determination is a reasonable one.
Monaghan, supra note 42, at 9.
54 Cf William Wade Buzbee, Note, AdministrativeAgency IntracircuitNonacquiescence 85
COLUM. L. RE,. 582, 595 (1985) (noting that Marbury did not decide the question whether
the binding effect of judicial rulings extends beyond the litigants in a particular case).
55 For example, the Court has characterized the implications of Marbury as follows:
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Indeed, not only is Marbury consistent in principle with a deferential standard of review, but much evidence also supports the proposition that early exercises of judicial review by state and federal courts
were extremely deferential in character. In his influential essay, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, James
Bradley Thayer found long-standing and consistent support for the
concept that courts invalidate legislative acts only when their unconstitutionality is established with great certainty. 56 Though the matter is
not entirely dear,57 many recent commentators agree that early notions ofjudicial review embodied a "clear-error" rule, such that courts
would not strike down legislation if its constitutionality were merely
subject to doubt. 58
Thayer's argument for deference had an important influence on
Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter. 59 Although the federal
courts have rejected his proposed clear-error standard as the general
benchmark for determining the constitutionality of federal legislaIf Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior paramount
law, unchangeable by ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts .... alterable when the legislature
shall please to alter it." Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a
principle that would limit Congressional power.
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (citation omitted).
56
See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HAmv. L. REV. 129, 140-44 (1893). Thayer also cited Thomas Cooley's leading constitutional law treatise to buttress this claim. See id. at 142 n.1 (citing Cooley treatise); see also
THoMAS M. COOLm', A TREATISE ON THE CONSTrruTIONAL LIMIrATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE

PowER

OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION

182-86 (Leonard W. Levy

ed., De Capo Press 1972) (1868) (discussing judicial deference to legislative decisions on
constitutional questions).
57
See Lawson & Moore, supra note 32, at 1277 ("It is true that many, if not most,
descriptions of the power ofjudicial review during the founding era used the language of
Thayerian deference, but those statements are not decisive .... "); G. Edward White, Revi-

sitingJamesBradley Thayer,88 Nw. U. L. REv. 48, 74-76 (1993) (questioning the accuracy of
Thayer's historical account).
58 See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CASTo, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 222-27 (1995); ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON,

Marbury v. Madison andJudicial Review 20-30 (1989); SYLVIA SNOWISS,JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE LAW OF THE CONsTITUTION 36-37, 63-65 (1990); MichaelJ. Klarman, MajoritarianJudicialReview: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEo. LJ. 491, 545 (1997). Snowiss argues that the
"doubtful case" rule arose from a notion of the Constitution as fundamental law, wholly
different from ordinary law. Judicial deference reflected the idea that the Judiciary had no
power to interpret this fundamental law. See SNOwISS, supra, at 190. In Snowiss's view,
Chief Justice John Marshall undercut the justification for deference by adopting a new
conception of the Constitution as merely "supreme ordinary law," which the courts could

interpret as they did other species of law. Id. at 3-4, 121-23.
59
See ALEXANDER M. BICxEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 35 (2d ed. 1986); PAUL
W. KAHN, LEGITIMACYAND HISTORY 84 (1992); MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE

COURTS: LAw OR POLITICS? 86-88 (1994); Jay Hook, A Brief Life offames Bradley Thayer, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8 (1993); Wallace Mendelson, The Influence ofJames B. Thayer upon the
Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter,31 VAND. L. REv. 71, 71 (1978).
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tion, 60 the Supreme Court until recently applied a very deferential
standard of review in particular areas, approving the "reasonable," not
merely the "correct," judgment of other branches. 6 1 In these specific
doctrinal realms, the Court did not simply substitute its view for that
of other governmental branches.
The current Court, however, has substantially narrowed the terrain of deference and now proclaims judicial supremacy across a
broad range of doctrine. In the state courts, by contrast, Thayer's concept of deference remains influential. The clear-error standard provides the test for judicial review in many states. These varying
approaches to deference, I will argue, correspond to the courts' understandings of the fundamental postulates of political power in their
different systems. The federal courts' broad declaration of supremacy
derives from a desire to prevent erosion of the concept of a national
government of limited and enumerated powers.6 2 To defer, the federal courts insist, would undermine the principle of limited government. The state courts' deferential attitude in turn accords with the
theory of the plenary power of state governments. The exercise of
state legislative power is presumed legitimate, requiring no special justification. State courts understand the concept of plenary power as a
mandate to defer to legislative judgments. The next two Parts demonstrate the contemporary patterns of deference and their connection
to important premises of political theory.
II
ENUmERATED PowERs AND THE DECLINE OF DEFERENCE IN

FEDERAL COURTS
In the wake of the New Deal, the U.S. Supreme Court applied
relatively lenient standards when enforcing limits on the scope of federal powers. In this area, the Court manifested great deference to the
judgments of other branches of government. Recently, however, the
Court has shown less inclination to defer across a wide realm of legal
doctrine.
A.

Enforcement Provisions.of the Reconstruction Amendments

Especially since the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a
deferential standard when reviewing the scope of congressional power
60 See SNOwISS, supra note 58, at 190; Monaghan, supra note 42, at 14; Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Deference to PoliticalDecisionmakersand the PreferredScope ofjudicial Review, 88 Nw. U.
L. REv. 296, 332 (1993). As will be discussed below, Thayer's rule has received a warmer
reception in the state courts. See infra Part III.
61 See infra Part ll.
62 See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Searchfor a judicially EnforceableFederalism,
83 MxNN. L. Rxv. 849, 892-93 (1999) (suggesting that the Court may have adopted a more

active role in order to check expansion of national power).
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under the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the similarly
worded sections of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments seem
to recognize a role for Congress in interpreting the Constitution:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." 63 The text does not expressly confer on
Congress a right to interpret the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, because enforcement is not literally equivalent to interpretation. Nevertheless, enforcement does entail some level of
interpretation. At the very least, the language contemplates a role for
Congress in realizing the values embodied in the Amendment. The
text clearly rules out the notion that it is up to the courts alone to
enforce this part of the Constitution. Though not unambiguous, the
congressional debates concerning the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment confirm that many of those involved in framing the
Amendment did not wish to give the courts sole responsibility for safeguarding the principles established therein. 64
Indeed, Supreme Court precedents support the idea that Congress has a special role in interpreting the rights that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects. In several cases, the Court has adopted a deferential posture, allowing Congress considerable leeway in protecting a
variety of interests related to the Reconstruction Amendments. In
Katzenbach v. Morgan,65 for example, the Court reviewed a section of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that effectively prohibited New York
from applying its literacy requirements to people who had attended
school in Puerto Rico. 66 In a prior case, the Court had found that
67
literacy requirements for voting did not violate the Constitution.
Morgan raised the question whether Congress's enforcement powers
nevertheless allowed it to void New York's literacy requirement. In
sustaining the Voting Rights Act, the Court indicated that it would
give great deference to congressional judgments in the enforcement
area: "Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."68 Further, the Court made clear that it would
not second-guess congressional determinations as to how best to en63
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also id. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."); id. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
64 See WILIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM PoLuTrCAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDIcIAL DocrrINE 122 (1988); McConnell, supranote 52, at 181-83.

65

384 U.S. 641 (1966).

66

See id. at 643-45.
See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959).
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.

67

68
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force the Fourteenth Amendment, including congressional views of
the appropriate weight to be given to state interests:
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess
and weigh the various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a
means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that would be affected by the nullification of the English
literacy requirement .... It is not for us to review the congressional
resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive
a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it
did. 69
In subsequent cases, the Court reaffirmed this broad deference to
congressional judgments. In City of Rome v. United States,70 for instance, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Fifteenth
Amendment authorized Congress to prohibit voting practices based
solely on their discriminatory effects. 71 In a case decided the same day
as City of Rome, the Court ruled that only discriminatory purpose, not
mere discriminatory effects, could give rise to a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.7 2 Nevertheless, in City of Rome, the Court upheld
the challenged legislation as within the scope of Congress's enforcement power, asserting that Congress "could rationally have concluded" that the outlawed practices created a risk of unconstitutional
73
conduct.
Scholars debated whether cases such as Morgan acknowledged
that Congress possessed a substantive power to determine the mean74
ing of the Constitution without regard to judicial interpretation.
Some found in Morgansimply a recognition of congressional expertise
in fashioning remedies to redress or prevent conduct that created a
risk of violating judicially established constitutional standards. 75 The
cases made clear, however, that under any theory, the Court would
afford great deference to congressional judgments regarding potenIkL at 653.
446 U.S. 156 (1980).
71
See id. at 173-75.
72
See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
73 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 177.
74
See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title 1: A MorganaticMariage 1969 Sup. CT.
REv. 81; Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power"and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. Rev. 819 (1986); Jesse H. Choper, CongressionalPower to ExpandJudicialDefinitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil WarAmendments, 67 MirrN. L. REv.
299 (1982); William Cohen, CongressionalPower to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection,
27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975).
75
See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HAgv. L. REv. 91, 103-07 (1965).
69
70
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tial threats to constitutional rights and the appropriate means for addressing these concerns.76
Recently, in City of Boerne v. ForesF7 and FloridaPrepaid Postsecon-

daty Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,7 8 the Supreme
Court cast grave doubt on the theory that section 5 confers on Congress a special power to implement the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court effectively disclaimed any deference to congressional construction of the Amendment and indeed deployed rhetoric indicating outright hostility to the notion of Congress's exercising an independent
role in construing the Constitution. FloridaPrepaidpresented the decisive break with the tradition of deference, but the earlier broad affirmation of judicial supremacy in Boerne established the Court's new
skeptical perspective for judicial review of congressional invocation of
79
section 5 power.
Boerne presented an unusual situation in which Congress attempted to use its section 5 authority to overrule a recent Supreme
Court case and reinstitute the prior judicial standard. The case concerned the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).80 Congress enacted the RFRA in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,8 1 which narrowed the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause protections for individuals
seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws.8 2 The RFRA
sought to restore the previous test, which prohibited the state and federal governments from impairing an individual's religious practice,
unless a compelling governmental interest justified the infringement.8 3 In enacting the RFRA, Congress relied on its authority to enforce the First Amendment, as incorporated through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 4 Boerne raised the question
whether reimposing the compelling-interest test came within Con85
gress's enforcement powers.
76 See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding congressional ban on
literacy tests for voting);Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (upholding
statute banning private racial discrimination in the sale of property) ("Surely Congress has
the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges
and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective
legislation.").
77

521 U.S. 507 (1997).

78
79
80
81
82
83

119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 512-14.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
84 See RELIGIOus FREEDOM RESTORATION Aar OF 1993, S. REP. No. 103-111, at 13-14
(1993), repinted in 1993 U.S.C.CALN. 1892, 1903; H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993).
85

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 529.

20001

JUDICLAL DEFERENCE

The Supreme Court held that Congress had exceeded the authority granted by section 5,86 rejecting the notion that Congress
might have substantive power to substitute its own interpretation of
87
the Fourteenth Amendment for the Supreme Court's construction.
The Court acknowledged that, in the process of remedying constitutional violations, Congress could prohibit conduct that would not itself be unconstitutional. 88 But the Court erected standards designed
to ensure that the remedial authority did not effectively give Congress
the right to redefine the Constitution. The Court stated that the legislation must have "congruence" and "proportionality" to the constitutional violation.8 9 Most significantly, the Court insisted that its own
interpretation of the Constitution provide the proper frame of reference. Congressional remedies had to be related to the scope of constitutional rights defined by the Court. The Court made clear that it
would give no deference to Congress's understanding of the constitutional commands; the interpretive authority of the Court was
supreme:
When the political branches of the Government act against the
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already
issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies
the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed. 90
Guided by this assertion of judicial supremacy, the Court concluded
that the RFRA must fail, because the statute prohibited vast amounts
See id. at 536.
See id. at 519-29.
88 See id. at 518.
89
Id. at 520.
90 Id. at 536; see also David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores
and CongressionalEnforcement of the Bill ofRights, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 31, 34 ("[Under Boerne),
the Constitution has a determinate meaning that only the Supreme Court can divine, and
if Congress deviates from the Court's substantive understanding in any way, its actions are
per se invalid."); Devins & Fisher, supra note 23, at 93 (citing Boerne as an example of the
Supreme Court's invocation of "judicial supremacy"); McConnell, supra note 52, at 163
(describing Boerne as adopting a "startlingly strong view ofjudicial supremacy"); Robert F.
Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 Wm. & MARY L. Rrv. 849, 849-50
(1998) (citing Boerneas an assertion of "judicial supremacy"); Mark Tushnet, Two Versions of
JudicialSupremacy, 39 Wk. & MARY L. Rxv. 945, 948 (1998) (describing Boerne as adopting a
theory of "judicialsupremacy"). Indeed, the Court expressed deep antipathy to Congress's
encroachment on what the Court conceived of as its constitutional prerogative. See Vicki
C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality,"Rights and Federalism, 1 J. CoNST. L. 583, 637 (1999) (noting
"Court's tone of rebuke to Congress"); see also Robert Nagel, The Role of the Legislative and
Executive Branches in Interpretingthe Constitution,73 CoRNzLL L. REv. 380, 382 (1988) ("[T]o
the extent that the Court does not recognize that interpretation is a shared enterprise, the
meaning and limits of constitutional principles will be defined in response to a wholly
irrational and irrelevant consideration, namely the Justices' anger.").
86

87
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of conduct that did not violate the Court's construction of the
Constitution. 91
In asserting a strong judicial role in policing the congressional
enforcement power, the Court in Boerne explicitly linked its review
with the concept of limited government: "Under our Constitution, the
Federal Government is one of enumerated powers.... The judicial
authority to determine the constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the 'powers of the legislature
are defined and limited .. ' "-92 In the Court's view, only judicial
supremacy could ensure that the national government remained a
government of limited powers.
Boerne sought to affirm its continuity with prior case law, which
had generally deferred to congressional enforcement actions under
the Reconstruction Amendments. 9 3 The Court claimed to recognize
that Congress had "notjust the light but the duty" to make constitutional judgments when enacting legislation. 94 Further, this interpretive role justified the Court in affording a "presumption of validity" to
congressional enactments. 9 5 Because the RFRA clearly seemed
designed to overrule the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and had far-reaching effects on activities that would have
been constitutional under the Court's doctrine, Boerne did not fully
test the Court's proclamations of deference. The Court plausibly
could claim continued deference to congressional judgments consistent with invalidating the RFRA.
FloridaPrepaidpresented quite a different case. Concerned about
states' interference with intellectual property rights, Congress had
passed legislation subjecting states to suit in federal court for patent
infringement. 9 6 Acting pursuant to its authority under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress sought to abrogate the immunity that states otherwise would enjoy in federal court.97 The underlySee City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
Id at 516 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)) (citations omitted).
93 See id. at 524-29.
94 Id. at 535.
91

92

95

Id.

See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541 (a)-(b), 2570 (1994) and 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(h), 296 (1994)).
97
See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093-94.
Under Supreme Court doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes nonconsenting states from individuals' suits in federal court for damages. See Seminole Tribe v.
96

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). In abrogating the states' immunity, Congress relied on its
authority under the Commerce Clause and the Patent Clause, as well as its powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 7-8, reprintedin 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3093-94. Subsequent to the enactment of the legislation, the Supreme
Court narrowed Congress's ability to abrogate state immunity, suggesting that only section
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ing theory of this legislation was that when states employed their
sovereign immunity to shield state infringement of patents, they deprived the patent holders of property without due process of law.98 In
enacting the statute, Congress wished to prevent what it perceived to
be unconstitutional efforts by states to deny a remedy for state impairment of intellectual property rights. 99
In contrast to the situation giving rise to Boerne, the Court had not
previously rebuffed this interpretation of the Constitution; nor in Forida Prepaiddid the Court reject the notion that a state might violate
the Constitution by using sovereign immunity to deny a remedy for its
patent infringement.1 0 0 Instead, the Court found that Congress had
not adequately supported its claims. 1 1 The Court insisted that Congress had not shown convincingly that the practice of unremedied
state patent infringement was sufficiently widespread to justify congressional action. 10 2 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
asserted that the record did not substantiate Congress's concerns:
Here, the record at best offers scant support for Congress' conclusion that States were depriving patent owners of property without
due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal court
patent actions.
Because of this lack, the provisions of the Patent Remedy Act
are "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed
10 3
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."
The thrust of the opinion is that Congress did not sufficiently document the widespread nature of the problem. Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist also noted that the "lack of support in the legislative record
is not determinative,"' 0 4 his evaluation of that record figures centrally
in the opinion. Congress did not convince the Court that the nature
05
and extent of the constitutional violations justified remedial action.'
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized abrogation. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-

73 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).

98
See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 6, 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3092,
3094; H.,. REP. No. 101-960, pt. 1, at 37-38 (1990); see also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-09 (1999) (discussing the
theory behind section 5).
99 See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 6, 8, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3092, 3094.
100
See FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2208.
101 See id. at 2207-11.
102
See id. at 2209-11.
103
Id. at 2210 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)) (citation
omitted).
104

Id.

See id.; see also Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1304, 1306
(1999) (noting the Florida Prepaid Court's "fairly extensive scrutiny of the legislative
record").
105
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According to the Court, much of the state action reached might have
10 6
been simply illegal, rather than unconstitutional.
Any notion of deference to congressional judgments is absent
from the Court's decision. The Court neither disputed that the conduct that Congress targeted was unconstitutional nor provided an independent basis for assessing what proportion of the conduct reached
by the statute would be merely illegal, but not unconstitutional.
Rather, the Court placed the onus for establishing the necessary factual predicate on Congress and found that Congress had not met its
burden. By contrast, the Boerne Court stated that Congress was entifled to "wide latitude" in determining the scope of remedial measures. 10 7 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in FNorida Prepaid,
"Congress' 'wide latitude' in determining remedial or preventive
measures has suddenly become very narrow indeed."'1 8 Boerne at least
paid lip service to the notion of "deference";10 9 FloridaPrepaid did
not.
The Court's recent decision in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents" °
continued this pattern of applying a strict standard in reviewing the
factual underpinnings of congressional enactments. In Kime the
Court held that Congress did not have authority under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)"' to state employers. 112 The Court reviewed
the legislative record and found that it did not justify the congressional action: "Our examination of the ADEA's legislative record confirms that Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem."1aa
Such a statement represents extraordinary judicial second-guessing of
a legislative determination.
The opinion in Kimel set a very high standard for the kind of information on which Congress could legitimately rely. The Court re106
See F/orida Prepaid 119 S.Ct. at 2210. Citing its due process jurisprudence, the
Court emphasized that state patent infringement that was unintentional, as opposed to
willful, might not give rise to a constitutional violation. See id. at 2209-2210 (citing Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)).
107 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
108 Forida Prepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2217 (StevensJ, dissenting) (quoting City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 520) (citation omitted).
109 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 ("It is for Congress in the first instance
to 'determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled to much deference." (quoting
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966))).
110 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000).
111 39 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
112
See Kime4 120 S.Ct. at 650.
113 Id. at 648-49.
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jected floor statements reporting constituent correspondence.' 1 4 The
Court also discounted a 1966 report by the State of California concerning age discrimination in public agencies: "Even if the California
report had uncovered a pattern of unconstitutional age discrimination in the State's public agencies at the time, it nevertheless would
have been insufficient to support Congress' 1974 extension of the
ADEA to every State of the Union." 115 Perhaps information becomes
outdated at some point, but the Court focused its objection not on the
lapse between the 1966 report and the 1974 enactment, but on the
limited geographic scope of the California report. The Court would
apparently require Congress to have reports from all, or at least many,
states. These stringent evidentiary requirements contradict any notion of deference to Congress's legislative judgments.
In a related area, the Court has explicitly acknowledged its declining deference to Congress. In its affirmative action jurisprudence,
the Court traditionally accorded special deference to congressional
judgments about the need for race-conscious remedial measures and
recognized section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as mandating a
special role for the national government in enforcing principles of
racial equality."16 The Court thus applied a less stringent standard of
review to federal, as opposed to state or local, affirmative action pro18
grams." 7 In the 1995 decision of Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena,
however, the Court rejected this special deference and insisted that
the same standard applies to affirmative action programs at all levels
of government."19
B. Federalism and the Scope of the Federal Commerce Power
With regard to questions of federalism and the scope of the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Court also has moved away from a deferential stance. In the 1985 case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
114
See id. at 649 (quoting, as an example of the weakness of evidence of public age
discrimination, the following statement by Senator Bentsen: "'Letters from my own State
have revealed that State and local governments have also been guilty of discrimination
toward older employees,'" 118 CONG. REc. 7745 (1972)).

15

Id.

116 See City of Richmond v. J. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
117 See Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1990) (explaining that different
standards of review apply to federal and state action); J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 491
("[O]ur treatment of an exercise of congressional power... cannot be dispositive here.").
118 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
119 See id. at 224 (asserting the principle of "congruence" in equal protection jurisprudence). For a discussion of the degree of judicial deference appropriate for affirmative
action policies generated by the political process, see Lisa E. Chang, Remedial Purpose and
Affirmative Action: FalseLimits and Real Harms, 16 YALE L. & POL'y RFv. 59, 101 (1997).
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TransitAuthority, 120 the Court disclaimed judicial enforcement of fed-

eralism-based restrictions on congressional power, stating that Congress itself was the proper body to implement constitutional principles
of federalism. 12 1 The national political process, the Court asserted,
122
would serve to protect the constitutional interests of the states.
Seven years later in New York v. United States,' 23 the Court resumed
judicial enforcement of state interests. 124 The Court did not expressly
overrule Garcia,'25 but it clearly abandoned the underlying constitu-

tional theory that envisioned the political process, rather than judicial
review, as the proper mechanism for enforcing federalism. 126 Writing
for the Court in New York v. United States,Justice O'Connor implied a

continuity with prior doctrine by citing references in the Garciaopinion to the constitutionally protected role of the states. 127 What she
failed to note, however, was that, in each cited instance, Garcia ex-

plained that the body with the primary responsibility for enforcing

128
Implicthese federalism provisions was Congress, not the courts.

itly, but unmistakably, New York v. United States rejected Garcia'snotion
of congressional, rather than judicial, enforcement of constitutional
principles of federalism.' 29 The Court focused simply on what it understood federalism to require. Deference to the constitutional judgments of Congress apparently did not merit contemplation.
The Court continued to use judicial review to protect the states
from supposed federal intrusion in Printz v. United States.'3 0 Despite
120

469 U.S. 528 (1985).
See id. at 556.
122 See id. at 550-55.
123 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
124 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 101 (1999)
(noting that "[t]he Supreme Court eventually abandoned the view that the Constitution
placed only process-based limits on Congress's power with regard to the states").
125 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160 (including Garcia in a list of cases
whose holdings "[t]his litigation presents no occasion to apply or revisit"). The Court
purported to distinguish cases like Garcia,in which the challenged legislation, such as minimnum wage laws, applied both to the states and to private parties. See id. The Court failed
to explain, however, why laws singling out the states for regulation posed greater threats to
federalism. See id. at 201-02 (White, J., dissenting); Moulton, supra note 62, at 871.
126 See Moulton, supra note 62, at 864 (describing recent cases, including New York, as
com[ing] quite close to overruling Garcia sub silentio").
127 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156, 162.
128 The Court noted:
121

Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy a special and
specific position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position.
But the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system
provides through state participation in federal governmental action.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
129 See Moulton, supra note 62, at 870-71.
130 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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protests from the dissent, the Court again ignored the Garcia approach of relying on the political, rather than the judicial, safeguards
of federalism. 13 1 Far from recognizing a constitutional role for congressional interpretation, the Court's opinion reads as if it is intervening to prevent the federal bully from further oppressing its traditional
victim. 13 2 Within the framework of the opinion, deference to the
bully would be unwise and unfair.
The Court has also recently asserted a more robust role for judicial review in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Since the New
Deal, the Court has allowed Congress great leeway in interpreting the
33
scope of the constitutional powers to regulate interstate commerce.'
But in United States v. Lopez,13 4 the Court held, for the first time in fifty
years,' 35 that congressional legislation exceeded the powers available
to Congress under the Commerce Clause. 136 The Court contended
that deferring to congressional construction of the Commerce Clause
would undermine the theory of enumerated powers; it noted that
prior case law had broadly construed the commerce power, "giving
great deference to congressional action," but that "to proceed any further. . . would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumer137
ation of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated."
The Court further claimed that deference to Congress would produce
8s
unchecked, unlimited governmental power.'
Justice Kennedy's concurrence explicitly addresses the Judiciary's
role in enforcing limits on the powers of Congress. 139 Justice Kennedy noted that each branch of government has the responsibility to
assess the constitutionality of its actions, and he commended Congress
140
for, at least at times, properly undertaking that constitutional duty.
He also acknowledged that the Court enjoys a greater institutional advantage in defining individual liberties than in policing the bounda131
132

133

See id. at 955-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 928-25.
SeeJ. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine 137 U.

PA. L. REv.

97,

150-51 (1988).
'34 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94 MICH. L. REv. 533, 535 (1995).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
137
Id. at 567 (citations omitted); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although Ijoin the Court's opinion in full, I write separately to emphasize that the
Tenth Amendment affirms the undeniable notion that under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated, hence limited, powers.").
138 SeeLopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate."); see also Moulton, supranote 62, at 856 (describing the Court as "casting about
for some check on national power").
139 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140
See id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135
136
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ries of the commerce power. 141 Despite these reservations, however,
Justice Kennedy argued that the importance of federalism justified an
active judicial role. 142 In view of the political pressures tempting Congress to exceed its constitutional powers, he asserted that the Court
must intervene to safeguard federalism as a critical part of the Ameri143
can constitutional structure.
As these cases indicate, although judicial proclamations of deference to congressional fact finding persist, they provide a mere preface
for the determination that Congress has forfeited any entitlement to
deference because of inadequate deliberation in a particular case.' 4 4
As in FloridaPrepaid,the Court's position in Lopez amounted to a conclusion, based on the Court's independent review of the factual underpinnings of the legislation, that Congress had not properly
considered the constitutionally significant interests. This position represents a substantial departure from an attitude of deference. Socalled deference that depends on an independent assessment of the
underlying basis for the legislation is functionally equivalent to
nondeference.
C.

Deference to Administrative Agencies

The evolving case law also undercuts prior proclamations of
broad judicial deference in other areas of law. Since the early days of
the administrative state, courts have shown some deference to the
legal interpretations of administrative agencies. 145 The 1984 Supreme
Court case of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.'46 appeared to provide a particularly strong statement of the deference principle, mandating broad judicial deference to an agency's
141

See id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The substantial element of political judg-

ment in Commerce Clause matters leaves our institutional capacity to intervene more in
doubt than when we decide cases, for instance, under the Bill of Rights even though clear
and bright lines are often absent in the latter class of disputes.").
142
See id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143
See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
144 See id. at 562-63; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-10 (1999).
145 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Although Hearst
provides the classic reference for early manifestations ofjudicial deference, some scholars
question whether that case actually exhibits a deferential approach. Compare RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATivE LAW
-AND PRocEss 374-75 (1999) (describing "deferential
rational basis test"), with ALRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILuAM T. MAYrON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
463-64 (1993) ("On closer examination, however, the Court engages in a much more thorough and independent analysis of the law [than some scholars have suggested].").
While mandating deferential review of issues of fact, the Administrative Procedure Act
arguably requires independent review of questions of law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994);
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1039,
1085-86 (1997). Nevertheless, courts have often employed a deferential standard. See id. at
1086.
146
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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interpretation of statutes. 147 The Court held that if a statute is ambiguous, courts must defer to the reasonable interpretation of the agency
authorized to implement that statute. 148 The evolving doctrine, however, indicates that the Court has lost confidence in such exercises of
administrative power.
Recent scholarship suggests that the Supreme Court has failed to
accord administrative agencies the deference that Chevron seemingly
requires. 149 Instead, the Court assumes an active role in reviewing
agency determinations. 150 Some scholars conclude thatjudicial deference may be a victim of the "new textualism." 151 Under the leadership ofJustice Scalia, federal courts emphasize deriving meaning from
the plain language of the statute. 15 2 Chevron contemplates deference
to agency interpretations if the language of the statute itself is ambiguous. 153 But the plain-language focus of the new textualism reduces

the instances in which the courts will find a gap that administrative
construction must fill. 15 4 A commitment to textualism appears to enSee id. at 842-45.
See id. at 842-43.
149
See Theodore L. GarrettJudicialReview After Chevron: The Courts Reassert TheirRole,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 59, 78-79; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Preceden4 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-93 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill,JudicialDeference];
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 351,
359-63 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, Textualism]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's
New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 749, 750 (1995); Zeppos, supra note 60, at 324; see alsoJohn F. Belcaster,
TheD.C. Circuit's Use of the Chevron Test: Constructinga Positive Theory ofJudicialObedience and
Disobedience 44 ADNMi.L. REv. 745, 754, 764 (1992) (finding ambivalence in the D.C. Circuit's responses to Chevron from 1984 to 1990). On the other hand, some studies have
documented greater Chevron deference by lower federal courts. See Peter H. Schuck & E.
Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station:An EmpiricalStudy ofFederalAdministrative Law, 1990
DuKE L.J. 984, 1007-13, 1057; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 Ailffl. L. REv. 59, 72-73 (1995) (contrasting courts of appeals' embrace of
Chevron deference with the U.S. Supreme Court's frequent rejection of deference).
150 See Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 149, at 980-85; Merrill, Textualism, supra
note 149, at 357-62; Pierce, supra note 149, at 750.
151 See, e.g., Merrill, Textualism, supra note 149 (discussing the tension between textualism and Chevron deference).
152
See id. at 351-52.
153
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
154 See Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 149, at 990-92; Merrill, Textualism, supra
note 149, at 354-63; Pierce, supra note 149, at 752. But see Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory
Interpretationto Improve the Legislative Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L.
& POL. 105, 133 n.153 (1997) (questioning whether the conclusions of Merrill and Pierce
rest on a representative sample of cases); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An EmpiricalStudy of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 53-59
(1998) (presenting empirical data, drawn from decisions of courts of appeals, that question the link between judges' interpretive methodologies and their proclivity to defer to
administrative agencies); cf. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit; 83 VA. L. Rrv. 1717, 1771 (1997) (concluding that political ideology has a
significant influence on administrative law decisions by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit).
147
148
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tail a belief that statutes generally have a determinate meaning that
one can ascertain by reading only the text of the legislation and a
dictionary. Justice Scalia himself has asserted a connection between
textualism and the absence of deference to administrative agencies:
"One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron
deference exists." 155 At the same time, in reviewing agency policy determinations, courts have continued to apply a "hard look" doctrine
15 6
that involves close judicial scrutiny.
The administrative deference that Chevron mandates can be understood as ensuring the vitality of the modem activist government.
One of the original barriers to the development of the administrative
state was the nondelegation doctrine, under which courts prohibited
Congress from delegating lawmaking authority to other bodies, including administrative agencies. 57 As part of its validation of the New
Deal, the Court desisted from enforcing the nondelegation doctrine,
thus allowing Congress broad discretion to allocate legislative
power. 158 One can justify deferential review on the theory that congressional delegation of lawmaking authority implies a restriction on
judicial review of the exercise of that authority.159 Deference thus en-

sures that Congress, not the judiciary, will have the primary role in
allocating lawmaking power. Deference protects congressional decisions from the rigorous review that the nondelegation doctrine requires. Professor Jerry Mashaw forcefully puts the matter: "[T] he
Court seems to have written its opinion in Chevron as if to drive the last
nail in the sporadically reopened casket of the nondelegation
60

doctrine."1

155 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DuxE
LJ. 511, 521.
156 The U.S. Supreme Court blessed the "hard look" doctrine in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44 (1983). For a
discussion of the application of the hard-look doctrine and its effects on the rulemaking
process, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"the Rulemaking Process, 41
DuKE L.J. 1385, 1410-26 (1992); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking. A Response to ProfessorSeidenfeld, 75 Tax. L. REv.525, 539-56 (1997); and Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossfication: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify JudicialReview of
Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 Tax. L. Rav. 483, 490-99 (1997).
157 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balanceof Powerin the Administrative State, 89 COLuM. L. Rav. 452, 478-88 (1989) (describing the nondelegation doctrine's
central role in the battle over the development of the modem administrative state).
158 See id. at 483-88.
159 See Monaghan, supra note 42, at 25-28.
160 Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism,and the InterpretationofFederalStatutes,
32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 834 (1991). For an extended discussion of the connection
between Chevron and the nondelegation doctrine, see Douglas W. Kmiec, JudicialDeference
to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADnI. LJ.269, 271-80
(1988).
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The erosion of Chevron deference bespeaks a retreat from this affirmation of the activist, administrative state. Robust judicial review
need not be inconsistent with support for the administrative state. Judicial review of agency inaction, for example, might facilitate congressional efforts to ensure that regulations further the public interest.
Contemporary doctrine, however, does not promote agency intervention.1 61 The recent turn to textualism corresponds instead to a loss of
faith in the concept of an activist government. 16 2 Skepticism about
the benefits of governmental intervention gives rise to an emphasis on
mechanical rules that are easily applied and perhaps not subject to
strategic manipulation. 63 Professor Merrill has contrasted the present situation with earlier periods in which "courts saw themselves as
playing a purposive, constructive role in managing the administrative
state.' 64 That attitude, he argues, is now absent.
In keeping with this desire to curb congressional power, a recent
decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 165 indicates that judicial enforcement of the nondelegation
doctrine may be reawakening after a sixty-year slumber.' 66 Current
developments in administrative law thus manifest increasing concern
with checking federal governmental power and an accompanying
growth in judicial hegemony.
D.

The Political Question Doctrine

The political question doctrine represents still another category
of cases in which courts traditionally have deferred to the determinations of other governmental actors. Indeed, in its strongest form, the
political question doctrine constitutes an area in which courts have
absolutely refused to review decisions made by other branches of govSome have found a more direct connection between deferential decisions and the
substance of a case. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency
Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Tes 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 431, 474-75 (1996)
("Our tests show that the Court does not uniformly endorse judicial deference, but rather
does so discriminately in the years where the doctrine yields policy outcomes more to the
Court's liking."); Kerr, supranote 154, at 49 ("Just as the political model asserts,judges who
applied Chevron in cases with clear political ramifications tended to reach results consistent
with their political views.").
161 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (restricting review of agency decisions not to undertake enforcement actions).
162 See Merrill, supra note 145, at 1044.
163
See id.
164 Id. at 1092.
165 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
166 For a critique of the American Trucking court's understanding of the appropriate
judicial role in reviewing administrative action, see Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act
UnconstitutionaP,98 MicH. L. REv. 303 (1999).
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ernment.167 Driven by separation of powers concerns, 168 this strong
form of the doctrine establishes an exception to judicial review, an
area beyond the cognizance of courts.
As is appropriate for a doctrine that limns the borders ofjudicial
review, the political question doctrine traces its origin to the same
source as the doctrine of judicial review: Marbury v. Madison.169 In
expounding the doctrine of judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged a category of cases in which governmental actors exercise
discretion of a kind not reviewable by a court.170 However, the con171
tours of this category have never been subject to precise definition.
Here, as elsewhere, the text of the Constitution does not provide de172
finitive guidance.
The decline of judicial deference with regard to political questions can be traced back further than the parallel decline in the other
substantive areas examined above. 173 In the 1960s, the Supreme
Court issued two decisions that suggested few limits to the Court's
powers of review. In Baker v. Car, 174 the Supreme Court overcame its
prior resistance to entering the field of state apportionment decisions
and invalidated Tennessee's system of allocating legislative representation. 17 5 In Powell v. McCormack,176 the Court reviewed and rejected the
177
House of Representatives' decision not to seat one of its members.
These Supreme Court decisions signaled the decline of the doctrine,
167

See DavidJ. Bederman, Deference orDeception: Treaty Rights as PoliticalQuestions, 70 U.

CoLo. L. REv. 1439, 1439-40 (1999) (distinguishing between courts' merely deferring to

the decisions of other branches and courts' absolutely abjuring review of those decisions).
168 See Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other
Nixon v. United States, 1993 Sup. CT. Rev. 125, 135; RobertJ. PushawJr.,Justiciabilityand
Separation of Powers: A Neo-FederalistApproach, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 393, 497 (1996).
169 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
170 See id. at 165-66 ("By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own
conscience.").
171 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LA~V § 2.8.1, at 118-19 (1997); Mulhern,
supra note 133, at 104.
172 Professor Pushaw has explained the issue as follows:
[T]he real issue is whether a constitutional question must be left to a political branch for a fina non-reviewable decision. And that determination cannot be based on the Constitution's text, which nowhere states that any
particular exercise of legislative or executive power is or is not judicially
reviewable. Therefore, interpretation must focus primarily not on the Constitution's language, but instead on its structure, political theory, history,
and precedent.
Pushaw, supra note 168, at 501 (footnotes omitted).
173

See supraPart IIA-C.

174 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
175 Compare id. at 237 (finding justiciable a challenge to state apportionment system)
with Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-56 (1946) (finding same to be nonjusticiable).
176 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
177 See id. at 549-50.
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and subsequent developments have not suggested its revival. 178 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the doctrine "may be falling into desuetude. ' 179 In the 1993 case of Nixon v. United States, 8 0
the Court did find nonjusticiable the question whether certain Senate
procedures fell below the standard mandated by the Constitution's
command that the Senate "try"' 1 impeachments. 18 2 But even in this
case, Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, rejected the political
question doctrine. 183 Justice Souter adopted at best a lukewarm version of the doctrine, purporting to find the question nonjusticiable,
but insisting that judicial review might be appropriate if the Senate's
184
procedures were too troubling.
The contested status of the political question doctrine in the context of impeachment and the absence of its application in other
realms suggest that the area protected from judicial review by the doctrine remains small. As a historical matter, the political question doctrine reached its zenith with the New Deal Court' 8 5-a Court that
sought to allow the federal government freedom to address the needs
of the emerging national economy. Certainly, the decline of the doctrine conforms to the current Court's renewed concern with imposing
judicial restraints on the scope of federal power.
The area of foreign affairs presents an exception to the pattern of
nondeference, but an exception that conforms to the overall theory of
deference advanced in this Part. The Court rarely finds nonjusticiable
political questions in foreign affairs cases. 18 6 The Court does, how178 See generallyTHOMAS M. FR CK,PonnrcAL QUESTIONS/JuDIcIAs ANswERs: DOES THE
RuLE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN ArAnRs? 20 (1992) (summarizing cases in which courts

have refused to apply the political question doctrine).
179
Id. at 61; see also Bederman, supra note 167, at 1445 ("The recent decisions have all
but given the political question doctrine a quiet burial.").
180 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
181 U.S. CONST.art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
182 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238.
183 See id. at 239-52 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
184 Justice Souter stated:
If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of
its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply "'a bad guy,'" judicial
interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority,
and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit ajudicial
response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel
silence.
Id. at 253-54 (SouterJ., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted); see also MichaelJ.
Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability:Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 DuRE
L.J. 231, 248-61 (1994) (discussing different theories regarding the scope ofjudicial review
of impeachments following Nixon).
185 See Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ. 597, 625
(1976).
186 See Bederman, supra note 167, at 1442-46.
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ever, defer heavily to executive decisions in this area.1 8 7 In foreign

88
affairs, the review is often loose in theory, but nonexistent in fact.

This relatively lenient standard of review provides further evidence of
the connection between deference and a theory of enumerated powers. Foreign affairs is an exceptional area in which the Court has
found the power of the federal government to be plenary, rather than
limited.' 8 9 Therefore, the unusual deference in foreign affairs corresponds to this unusual theory of federal governmental power.
E. A Nondeferential Approach to Overruling Miranda
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
shows that lower courts are following the Supreme Court's disdainful
approach to the constitutional interpretations of coordinate branches
of government. In United States v. Dickerson,190 the Fourth Circuit essentially held that Congress had overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona'9 ' by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501.192
Although this thumbnail sketch might leave the impression that the
case represents an instance of judicial deference, the opinion takes
pains to reject deference to the constitutional interpretation of other
branches of government. 193 In its assertive approach and in its subtext of limiting federal power, Dickerson continues the themes dis19 4
cussed earlier.
Commentators have posited a role for Congress in modifying prophylactic rules created by the Court. 195 For example, in the area of
criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has fashioned rules designed
to protect constitutional rights by reaching more broadly than the
Constitution itself. The rules flowing from Mirandain particular set
up certain procedures that must be followed for a confession to be
187
188

See Strauss, supranote 29, at 126-27.
See Bederman, supra note 167, at 1446.
189
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936) ("The
broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and

proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of
our internal affairs."); Sarah H. Cleveland, The PlenaryPower Background of Curtiss-Wright,
70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1127, 1131-32 (1999); G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of
Foreign AffairsJurisprudence,70 U. COLo. L. Ray. 1109, 1120 (1999). Professor White provides a critique of the conventional view of a sharp dichotomy between domestic and foreign realms. See id. at 1121-23.
190 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
191 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
192 See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 687.
193 See id. at 672, 687-88.
194 See supra Part IIA-D.
195 See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1,
26-29 (1975) (discussing the Court's role in creating a constitutional common law of civil
liberties).
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admissible in state or federal court.' 96 The Supreme Court, however,
has refused to constitutionalize the specific requirements of Miranda.197 In Miranda's wake, Congress enacted legislation, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, that sought to provide an alternative, more permissive framework for determining the admissibility of confessions in federal
court. 19 8

Section 3501 provides a fascinating example of the potential interplay among coordinate branches of government in interpreting the
Constitution. Arguably, § 3501 represents a congressional attempt to
redefine the prophylactic rules necessary to protect the rights of persons subject to police interrogation. For its part, the executive branch
has concluded that § 3501 is unconstitutional because it does not adequately protect the judicially defined constitutional rights of the accused. 199 Any adjudication involving § 3501 would seem to require
careful consideration of the overlapping roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government in interpreting the
Constitution.
Surprisingly, however, the Fourth Circuit in Dickerson managed to
reach the issue in a manner that not only failed to recognize the role
of other branches in interpreting the Constitution, but actually
mocked that role. The court found that in enacting § 3501, Congress
sought to modify Miranda.20 0 Citing Boerne, the Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that Congress could play a role in shaping an interpretation of the Constitution. 20 1 Accordingly, the court concluded
that § 3501 could be constitutional only if the Miranda rules were not
constitutionally required. 20 2 Based on passages from various Supreme
Court opinions, the Fourth Circuit held that Miranda did not have
constitutional roots, but was instead merely a judicially fashioned rule
196

The Court stated these now familiar procedures as follows:

[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
Miranda,384 U.S. at 479.
197 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985); New York v. Qyaries, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
198
See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 38-51 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.CA.N. 2112, 212438; see also Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider18 USC § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1029, 1033 (1998) ("Congress made no secret of its hope that Section 3501
would undo Miranda.").
199 See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
578 (1999).
200 See id. at 686-87.
201
See id. at 687-88.
202 See id.
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of evidence subject to legislative displacement. 20 3 In the course of upholding § 3501, the court thus rejected a role for Congress in fashioning constitutional prophylactic rules.
This reasoning casts doubt on the applicability of Mirandarules
in state courts. Although § 3501 applies only in federal prosecutions, 20 4 by insisting on the nonconstitutional status of Miranda, the
Fourth Circuit invited states to deviate from Miranda as well. The
court had to acknowledge that the Supreme Court clearly understood
Mirandaprinciples to govern in state court cases, such as Mirandaitself. The Fourth -Circuit ambiguously characterized the justification
for applying Mirandain state cases as "an interesting academic question."20 5 Given the Fourth Circuit's understanding of Mirandarules as

not grounded in the Constitution, the question would seem to be "not
of an intricacy proportioned to its interest."20 6 If Mirandarules are
essentially guidelines for federal practice, which Congress may alter, it
is difficult to conceive how the rules could be obligatory on states.
Authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules binding state, but
20 7
not federal, courts would be an odd theory of supervisory power.
The Dickerson opinion leads directly to the conclusion that nojustification exists for applying Mirandain state court proceedings. Dickerson
thus suggests significant limits on the scope of federal regulation of
state law enforcement practice.
The Dickerson court reserved its harshest language for criticizing
the executive branch's assertion of a role in constitutional interpretation. Since the enactment of § 3501 in 1968, no presidential administration has sought to use the provision to override Mirandarules. 20 8
The Clinton Administration specifically had taken the position that
§ 3501 was unconstitutional. 20 9 Theories of coordinate branch interpretation suggest that the Executive should make an independent
judgment about the constitutionality of statutes and even that the
President is duty-bound to refuse to enforce laws that the President
203

See id. at 688-92. For contrary arguments regarding the constitutional status of Mi-

randarules, see, for example, HaroldJ. Krent, The Supreme Court as anEnforcementAgency, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1149, 1175-76 (1998).

204 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994).
205 Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 691 n.21. The court, however, noted that the answer to this
question "has no bearing on our conclusion that Miranda'sconclusive presumption is not
required by the Constitution." Id.
206 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
207 For a discussion of the theory of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority over
federal courts and the application of this theory to Miranda,see Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on theAuthority of the
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1514-15 (1984).
208 See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672.
209 See id.
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finds unconstitutional.2 1 0 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has
never addressed the constitutionality of § 3501.211 The executive decision not to enforce § 3501 thus raised interesting issues about executive interpretation of the Constitution. The Fourth Circuit, however,
summarily rejected any role for the President in constitutional interpretation. The court castigated the Justice Department's refusal to
enforce the statute, accusing it of "elevating politics over law."2 1 2 Ironically, in the course of finding that Congress had effectively overruled
Miranda, the court couched its opinion in the rhetoric of judicial
supremacy, thus denying any place for the Legislature or the Executive in constitutional interpretation.
F.

Summary

Recent federal cases endorse notions of judicial supremacy and
generally reject deference to other branches of government. Deference survives mainly in the rational-basis test applied to due process
and equal protection challenges that do not implicate a fundamental
right or a suspect classification.2 1 3 Tracing the question of deference
210 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 914-24; see also Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199 (1994) (discussing circumstances in which the President may decline to enforce statutes that the President
believes are unconstitutional). But see CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTAL DFiA.NCE OF
"UNcONSTr
oNAL" LAWS: REVNG THE ROYAL PREROGATrvE passim (1998) (rejecting
presidential authority to decline enforcement of statutes that the President believes are
unconstitutional). In view of traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion, the arguments
for presidential authority to decline enforcement of statutes on grounds of unconstitutionality may be particularly strong in the area of criminal law. See Miller, supra note 198, at
1054-58 (discussing this argument and rejecting its application in the case of § 3501).
211
See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671.
212 Id. at 672. A dissenting judge rejected this characterization and asserted that the
court should respect the executive's decision not to rely on the statute. See id. at 696-97
(Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
213 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARy. L. REv.
56, 58 (1997) (-IT]he 'rational basis' test familiarly employed under the Equal Protection
Clause reflects an explicitly restrained judicial response to the phenomenon of reasonable
disagreement."); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131, 1137 (1999) (linking rationality review to James
Bradley Thayer's argument for judicial deference); cf. Monaghan, supra note 42, at 33
("Wherever the rationality test obtains, Marbury's demand of independent judicial judgment is a weak one, functionally equivalent to deference, with the judicial role confined to
policing boundaries."). Conversely, Professor Komesar points out:
In contemporary jurisprudence, most legislative determinations of equal
treatment or protection of property receive no meaningful judicial consideration at all. Minimal scrutiny of that vast range of legislation referred to
as "economic and social" is in reality zero scrutiny, and it cannot be realistically associated with the absence of "clear error" no matter how one defines
"clear error."
Neil K. Komesar, Slow Learningin ConstitutionalAnalysis, 88 Nw. U. L. Rzv. 212, 218 (1993);
see also David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 205-06
(1988) (characterizing rational-basis review as prophylactic underenforcement of constitutional provisions).
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to a theory of enumerated federal powers helps to explain the continued judicial deference in these areas. In due process and equal protection cases, federal courts most often review the actions of state and
local, rather than federal, governmental bodies. A commitment to a
doctrine of enumerated federal powers has no application in challenges to nonfederal entities. By contrast, the areas of declining deference canvassed above 214 relate to doctrines applicable almost
exclusively to federal action. 21 5 It is deference to federal action that
has abated.
III
PLENARY POWER AND DEFERENuiAL JUDICIAL REvIEw UNDER
STATE CONSTTUTONS

State court doctrine stands in marked contrast to this recent federal trend. While Supreme Court deference to Congress has declined
in many areas, state court deference to state legislatures continues
to be strong. Broad generalizations are perilous, but the overall pattern appears clear. 216 In reviewing claims under a state constiuSee supra Part II.A-E.
Although the political question doctrine also may be applied to state action, most
of the recent cases raising political question issues relate to federal practices. See, e.g.,
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (involving federal impeachment proceedings);
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (involving federal reapportionment methods); United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992) (same); United
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (challenging a provision of the federal Victims
of Crime Act of 1984 under the Origination Clause).
216 Indeed, while deferential review has always been the norm in state courts, the pockets of nondeferential review that did exist appear to be declining. For a time, many state
courts engaged in substantive due process review of social and economic legislation, despite the demise of such review in the federal courts. See James C. Kirby, Jr., Expansive
Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
CoNsrrnIoNAL LAw 94, 99-105 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985); Developments in the Law:
The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1463 (1982) [hereinafter Developments]; Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in HistoricalPerspective,ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SOL, Mar. 1988, at 33, 40-41; PeterJ. Galie, State Courts and Economic
Rights,ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc., Mar. 1988, at 76; A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts
and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Cour4 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 879-91 (1976).
Economic substantive due process review persists in some states. See ROBERT F.
WILLuAS, STATE CONSTITIfONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 291 (3d ed. 1999); Paul W.
Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 459, 472-73
(1996) (finding that some state courts impose a stricter rationality standard than do the
federal courts). The practice, however, has waned. See Susan P. Fino, Remnants of the Past:
Economic Due Process in the States, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIREIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAING 145, 156-57 (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988).
Perceived incursions on the judicial domain provoke more assertive responses from
state courts. For instance, state courts have resisted attempts to reduce their regulatory
authority over lawyer discipline and rules of practice. See Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency
and Universalismin State Separationof PowersDiscourse,4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 104
& nn.107-08 (1998). Recently, this defense of judicial authority has led state courts to
invalidate tort reform measures as unacceptable limits on the remedial powers of theJudiciary. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062,
214
215
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tion, 21 7 state courts frequently employ a highly deferential standard,

insisting that legislation be upheld unless it is "unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt-"218 In this regard, James Bradley Thayer's
approach 2 9 seems to have continuing vitality in the states. Indeed,
some states, including Nebraska and North Dakota, constitutionalize

deference by requiring a supermajority vote of the state supreme
court to declare a law unconstitutional. 220 In Nebraska, five of seven
1097 (Ohio 1999) (holding that Ohio tort reform statute "usurps judicial power" and thus
violates Ohio's constitution); William Glaberson, State Courts Sweeping Away Laws Curbing
Suitsfor Injury, N.Y. Tiars, July 16, 1999, at Al.
217 This Article addresses the practice of state court judicial review only under state
constitutions. When reviewing federal questions, state courts must apply the standard of
review federal law dictates. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1967) (holding
that federal law provides the standard for review of federal constitutional errors in state
courts).

218 Ex parteBronner, 623 So. 2d 296, 298 (Ala. 1993); accord McClead v. Pima County,
849 P.2d 1378, 1382 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Winslow Constr. Co. v. City & County of Denver,
960 P.2d 685, 692 (Colo. 1998); City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 725 A.2d 937, 941 (Conn.
1999); Blair v. Cayetano, 836 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Haw. 1992); In re C.S., 516 N.W.2d 851, 857
(Iowa 1994); Moore v. Board of Supervisors, 658 So. 2d 883, 884 (Miss. 1995); State v.
Butler, 977 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Mont. 1999); City of New York v. State, 562 N.E.2d 118, 121
(N.Y. 1990); State ex reL Shkurti v. Withrow, 513 N.E.2d 1332, 1338 (Ohio 1987); Seibert v.
Clark, 619 A.2d 1108, 1113 (RI. 1993); Rothschild v. Richland County Bd. of Adjustment,
420 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 1992); State v. Heinrich, 449 N.W.2d 25, 27 (S.D. 1989); Granite
Falls Library Capital Facility Area v. Taxpayers of Granite Falls Library Capital Facility Area,
953 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Wash. 1998); Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 595 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Wis.
1999); Frank v. State, 965 P.2d 674, 678-79 (Wyo. 1998); cf I-lava v. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d
306, 308 (Neb. 1995) ("A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all reasonable
doubts will be resolved in favor of its constitutionality."); Society of Separationists, Inc. v.
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993) (rejecting the unconstitutional-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in favor of the principle that "[t]he act is presumed valid, and we
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality").
219 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
220
The Ohio Constitution previously contained a supermajority requirement, but this
provision was repealed in 1944. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 editor's comment (West
1999). The Ohio provision occasioned the following outburst by ChiefJustice Carrington
T. Marshall, in an opinion in which an insufficient majority concurred in a holding of
unconstitutionality:
When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for the majority
of the Supreme Court of Ohio to differ from the judgment pronounced by
the minority, and to assume the separate though inferior station to which
the amendment of 1912 has consigned them, a decent respect to the opinions of the bench and bar of the state requires that they should declare the
causes which impel them to the separation.
City of E. Cleveland v. Board of Educ., 148 N.E. 350, 352-53 (Ohio 1925) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting). The adoption of supermajority requirements in these states was nearly contemporaneous. Ohio adopted its requirement in 1912, North Dakota in 1919, and Nebraska in 1920. See Katherine B. Fite & Louis Baruch Rubinstein, Curbing the Supreme
Court-StateExperiencesand FederalProposals,35 MIcH-. L. RE~v. 762, 774, 779, 780 (1937). For
a discussion of these state supermajority requirements, see id. at 772-80; Carl L. Meier,
Power of the Ohio Supreme Courtto Declare Laws Unconstitutional 5 U. CIN. L. REv. 293 (1931);
and William W. Redmond, Note, ConstitutionalLaw--Requirement in State Constitution of More
Than a Majority of Supreme Court to InvalidateLegislation, 19 NEB. L. Buts.. 32 (1940). For a
discussion of the procedural problems produced by such supermajority requirements, see
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state supreme court justices must concur to invalidate legislation. 22 1
In North Dakota, a decision holding legislation unconstitutional re222
quires the votes of four of the five members of the supreme court.
This judicial deference has manifested itself in areas such as
school finance reform, in which courts have proven very hesitant to
find state constitutional violations or to enforce remedies once violations have been established.2 23 The deferential attitude also appears
in the reluctance of state courts to interpret their constitutions independently of the federal Constitution. Many state constitutions contain individual rights provisions that mirror those in the federal Bill of
Rights. State courts' power to interpret these guarantees as having
224
meanings different from their federal analogs is well established.
Recently, much judicial and scholarly attention has focused on state
rights provisions and their potential to provide additional protections
for individuals at a time when the Warren Court-era expansion of
rights guarantees appears to have passed. 2 25 Research indicates, however, that for the most part, state courts follow federal constitutional
analysis, seldom offering additional protections under their state
226
constitutions.
Robert L. Hausser, Limiting the Voting Power of the Supreme Court: Procedure in the States, 5
OHIo ST. LJ. 54 (1938).
221
See NEB. CoNsT. art. V, § 2; see also State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 455 N.W.2d 749,
749-50 (Neb. 1990) (upholding legislation despite finding of unconstitutionality by four of
seven justices).
222 See N.D. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4 (requiring concurrence of four justices to hold legislation unconstitutional); id. art. VI, § 2 (setting membership of supreme court at five justices); see also Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 250 (N.D. 1994)
(upholding state's school finance system despite the finding of three of five justices that
the system violates the state constitution).
223 See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 1072, 1082-85 (1991); see also Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and
Engagement: The Remedies ProblemPosed by Sheffv. O'Neill-and a ProposedSolution, 29 CoNN.
L. REv. 1115, 1138 (1997) (noting the extreme deference of state courts to legislatures in
implementing remedies in school finance cases).
224 Cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42 (1983) (noting that state courts may
use federal precedent as mere guidance in deciding cases).
225
For example, Justice Brennan has urged increased attention to state constitutions.
See WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HiARv.
L. REv. 489, 495-98 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardiansof IndividualRights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 547-48
(1986). Other commentators also have championed the "new judicial federalism." See
Shirley S. Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141 (1985); Robert F. Utter, State ConstitutionalLaw, the United
States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64
WAsH. L. REv. 19 (1989); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Court Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result 35 S.C. L. REv. 353 (1984); see also
Developments, supra note 216, at 1367 ("The present function of state constitutions is as a
second line of defense for those rights protected by the federal Constitution and as an
independent source of supplemental rights unrecognized by federal law.").
226 See, e.g., BARRY LATZER, STATE CoNsrrruToNs AND CRIMINALJUsTIcE 158-59 (1991)
(finding little state court deviation from federal doctrine); Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann
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Many reasons may explain this tendency of state courts to interpret state constitutions as having the same meaning as the federal
Constitution, a practice sometimes termed "lockstep interpretation."
Considerations of convenience and uniformity, for example, may be
involved. 227 The rejection of independent interpretation, however,
also exemplifies a deferential attitude toward applying the power of
judicial review. State courts hesitate to declare laws unconstitutional,
and lockstep interpretation provides a haven for this deferential posture. 228 In brief, lockstep interpretation represents an extreme ex-

pression of judicial passivity. The Supremacy Clause requires that
state courts apply the federal Constitution against state officials. 22 9 A
differing interpretation of state constitutions could only put additional constraints on state governmental action. By conforming state
constitutions to the federal standard, state courts afford the maximum
possible deference to state actors. Lockstep interpretation eliminates
the state constitution as an independent restriction on state governmental activity.2 30 Rejection of independent interpretation by state
courts thus embodies a deferential application ofjudicial review quite
different from that evident in recent federal case law.
This difference in state constitutional practice further suggests a
strong connection between deference and judicial views on fundamental aspects of constitutional structure. In explaining the deferential standard, courts and commentators often rely on the notion that,
Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, andJudicialPolicymaking, 16 JusT. Sys. J. 37,
42-48 (1992) (reporting the results of a survey that found substantial state court reliance
on federal law); Susan P. Fino, Judicial Federalism and Equality Guarantees in State Supreme
Courts, 17 PUBLIUS 51, 66-67 (1987) (same); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761, 780-84 (1992) (same); Barry Latzer, Into the '90s:
MoreEvidence That the Revolution Has a ConservativeUnderbelly, 4 EmERGING IssuEs ST. CONST.
L. 17, 17 (1991) (finding that state criminal procedure is looking "more and more like...
federal constitutional criminal law"); Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court
"Revolution," 74JuicATuRE 190, 19-94 (1991) (same); Michael E. Solimine &James L.
Walker, Federalism, Liberty, and State ConstitutionalLaw, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1457, 1467
(1997) ("Despite the considerable hoopla afforded a few decisions from a few states, the
vast majority of state courts follow federal law when construing the liberty-protective provisions of their own constitutions .... ."); G. Alan Tarr, The New JudicialFederalismin Perspective, 72 Nonm DAME L. REv. 1097, 1114-17 (1997) (summarizing research finding limited
state court reliance on state constitutions).
227 See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw, 84 VA. L.
REv. 389, 424 (1998).
228 I develop this argument in detail elsewhere. See id. at 419-28.
229 The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONSr. art. VI, § 2.
230 See Schapiro, supra note 227, at 421-22.
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in contrast to the national government of enumerated powers, state
governments enjoy plenary authority. 23 1 The underlying assumption
is that state governments may undertake any action that is not specifically prohibited; they need not look to their constitutions for
232
authorization.
The connection between the theory of plenary powers and the
deferential standard of judicial review is long-standing. In the 1884
case of Alexander v. People,23 3 for example, the Colorado Supreme

Court explained that it would strike down legislation only if no doubt
existed as to its unconstitutionality. 2 34 As support for this principle,
the court quoted ChiefJustice Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, who asserted in an 1834 opinion that courts "never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are
placed in theirjudgment beyond reasonable doubt."235 The Colorado

court explicitly linked that deferential standard to the plenary power
of the state legislature: "There would be greater force in the arguments employed to demonstrate the invalidity of the laws ... if the
state constitution, like the national constitution, was a grant of enu2 36
merated powers."
More recently, Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court
affirmed this theoretical distinction between the state and national
legislatures: "Unlike the federal Constitution, which is a grant of
power to Congress, the California Constitution is a limitation or restriction on the powers of the Legislature. '23 7 From the legislature's
plenary authority, Justice Tobriner derived the principle that the
court should adopt a deferential attitude in the exercise of judicial
review, resolving any doubts in favor of upholding the legislature's action. 238 The Rhode Island Supreme Court expressed similar senti239
ments in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun:
231
See G. AL.AN TAR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6-9 (1998); W. F. Dodd,
Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in ConstitutionalLaw, 29 YALE LJ. 137, 137 (1919).
232 See WILLL Ms, supra note 216, at 793-94.
233 2 P. 894 (Colo. 1884).
234 See id. at 896.
235 Id. (quoting Case of Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95 (1834)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236 Id.
237 Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Cal. 1981) (en banc) (quoting
Methodist Hosp. v. Saylor, 488 P.2d 161, 164 (Cal. 1971)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
238 See id.; see also WESLEY W. HORTON, THE CONNEMrcUT STATE CONSTITTON: A REFERENCE GUIDE 31 (1993) (noting the relationship between a broad grant of legislative authority and a deferential standard of judicial review); Michael J. Besso, Connecticut

LegislativePowerin the First Century ofState ConstitutionalGovernment, 15 QuINN'xAc L. REv. 1,
49 (1995) (same).
239

662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
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Because of the broad plenary power of the General Assembly, this

court's evaluation of legislative enactments has been extremely deferential .... Specifically, this court will not invalidate a legislative
enactment unless the party challenging the enactment can prove
beyond a reasonable doubt to this court that the statute in question is
240
repugnant to a provision in the constitution.
Just as the decline of deference in federal courts reflects increased
concern with limiting the power of the federal government, the continuation of deferential review in the states evinces an ongoing commitment to a theory of plenary state governmental power.
IV
ALTERNATIVE TH-otams oF JuicDICI

DERENCE

Having reviewed the varying deferential practices of state and federal courts and their connections to the concepts of enumerated and
plenary powers, I now examine three alternative theories of deference. In constructing frameworks to guide the exercise ofjudicial review, scholars have advanced theories based on textualism,
institutional competence, and democratic deliberation. This Part reviews these theories and examines their shortcomings.
Two criteria are essential for judging theories of deference. First,
the theory must be determinate. It must provide useful guidance in
deciding the appropriate level of deference to employ in a particular
situation. The application of the principle may be contestable, but at
least the relevant factors must be clear. Second, a theory of deference
must be consistent with the particular constitution in issue. Deference
involves the allocation of decision-making authority among different
branches of government. Such a fundamental issue of division of
power must accord with underlying constitutional principles.
In this Part, I contend that models of deference based on textualism and institutional competence are generally indeterminate. Without greater attention to underlying normative principles, neither of
these approaches can provide an adequate account of deference. The
principle of promoting deliberation fares somewhat better than the
others. Its focus on deliberative values provides more determinate
guidance. However, this model also can give rise to conflicting views
240 Id. at 44-45 (citation omitted). In a similar vein, in Board of Education v. City of St.
Louis, 879 S.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Mo. 1994), the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
Unlike the Congress of the United States, which has only that power
delegated by the United States Constitution, the legislative power of Missouri's General Assembly... is plenary, unless, of course, it is limited by
some other provision of the constitution. Any constitutional limitation,
therefore, must be strictly construed in favor of the power of the General
Assembly.
Id. (citations omitted).
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of deference. The singular focus on democratic deliberation, to the
exclusion of other constitutional values, presents further problems.
In particular, the majoritarian features of the model conflict with constitutionalism's basic commitment to protecting certain individual
2 41
rights from the effects of the normal democratic processes.
A. Textualism
One approach to determining the appropriate level of deference
is to refer to the document that the court is attempting to construe.
Following this framework, the court should look to the constitution
242
itself, or the statute in the administrative context, for guidance.
Then the court should simply follow the instructions supplied therein,
adopting the standard of review set forth in the constitution or statute.
Grounded in the authoritative document, this approach has strong
claims to interpretive legitimacy. The court applies the entire constitution or statute, including the portions detailing the standard of review. The text may present questions, but if it fails to provide a
definitive answer, it may at least establish the deference owed to various answerers.
Unfortunately, the documents being construed often lack accompanying interpretive guides. The U.S. Constitution, for example, includes no clear textual authorization for judicial review, much less a
general standard for its exercise. Only in rare instances does the Constitution speak to the proper allocation of reviewing authority.2 43 The

Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.2 44 But the Constitution does not specify whether congressional exercise of that power is unreviewable, subject to deferential
review, or subject to nondeferential review.2 45 The text of the Constitution thus does not indicate whether the standard of review adopted
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez24 6 was too firm, too soft,

or just right. Further, the text of the Constitution does not detail any
limits placed by federalism on congressional regulatory power. As the
241 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: ElectiveJudiciariesand the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. Rav. 689 (1995) (discussing the tension between electivejudiciaries and

constitutional democracy).
242 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 23, at 288-92 (discussing textual arguments for deference in particular areas).
243 One example is the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment: "[N] o fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII; cf. Paulsen, supra
note 23, at 288-92 (discussing textual exceptions to the general principle of coordinate
interpretation).
244 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
245 See Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpreter,48 Rxv. POL. 401, 404-06 (1986).

246

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Court itself acknowledged, the restrictions on the commandeering of
states' functions, identified in New York v. United States2 47 and Printz v.
United States,248 do not derive from any specific constitutional language.2 49 The Tenth Amendment may serve as a monument to federalism, but its language establishes no determinate restraints on
national power. 250 The text of the Constitution fails to settle the interpretive contest between Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authorit) 5 x and Printz, between relying on the political safeguards of
federalism and insisting on robust judicial protection of federalism.
With regard to the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction
Amendments, the text suggests some role for Congress in implementing those constitutional guarantees. As discussed above, however, the
conferral of the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation" neither
grants a specific interpretive role to Congress, nor establishes a standard for the judicial review of congressional action. The text simply
does not provide a particular allocation of authority for determining
the scope of federal power.
In the administrative context, Congress does occasionally specify
the standard for judicial review of agency action. The Chevron doctrine, however, applies only when the statute does not contain an explicit allocation of interpretive authority.2 52 Deference rests heavily
on the notion of a delegation of interpretive authority to the administrative agency and an implied restriction on the scope of judicial review. 255 Similarly, the text of the Constitution plays a role in one

aspect of the political question doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court has
247

505 U.S. 144, 161, 188 (1992).

521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
See id. at 905 ("[T]here is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question
... ."); Moulton, supra note 62, at 872 (noting the absence of a textual basis for the Court's
rule against "commandeering" state governments).
250
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156-57 ("The Tenth Amendment...
restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth
Amendment itself, which... is essentially a tautology."). In deriving principles of state
sovereign immunity from the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has demonstrated a similar
ability to reach beyond the confines of the Constitution's text. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S.
Ct. 2240, 2253-60 (1999) (rejecting arguments based on the text of the Eleventh Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) ("Although the text of the
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, 'we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it
says .... .'" (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991))).
251
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
252
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
253
See Merrill,JudicialDeference,supranote 149, at 995 ("Courts reconcile their duty to
'say what the law is' with the practice of deferring to agency interpretations of law by positing that Congress, in conferring authority on an agency to administer a statute, has implicitly directed courts to defer to the agency's legal views." (emphasis added)); Monaghan,
supra note 42, at 25-28.
248
249
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found nonjusticiable, political questions in cases that involve "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." 254 As the recent case of Nixon v. United
States255 illustrates, though, textual commitment constitutes only one

256
strand of the doctrine.

257
Some state constitutions do expressly authorize judicial review,

but they do not explicitly establish the applicable standard. Further,
the few textual signals that do exist have not been particularly influential. A potential interpretive guide present in some state constitutions,
for example, is an admonition that the rights granted therein are independent of those established in the federal Constitution. 258 This
provision might stand as textual authority to interpret the state constitution without reference to the federal Constitution, thus rejecting
the deferential posture implicit in lockstep interpretation. However,
these provisions do not appear to deter state courts from following
federal doctrine and thus adopting a restrained mode of judicial review under the state constitution.
The Rhode Island Constitution, for instance, asserts the following: "The rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on
those guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States." 259 But
Rhode Island courts generally follow the federal lead and have thus
developed a rule restricting departures from federal doctrine. 260 In
short, while some state constitutions do offer a modicum of textual
interpretive guidance, this language provides little assistance in specifying the mode ofjudicial review that state courts actually apply. As in
the other areas reviewed above, interpretive questions vastly outstrip
any textual answers.
254 Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
255 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
256 See id. at 236 (relying in part, but only in part, on the textual commitment argument in rejectingJudge Nixon's plea forjudicial review of the procedures employed by the
Senate during his impeachment trial).
257 See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, 1 5 ("Legislative acts in violation of this Constitution
or the Constitution of the United States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.");
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b) (2) (conferringjurisdiction on the NewYork Court of Appeals to
review judgments declaring that a state or federal statute violates the state or federal constitutions); VA. CONSr. art. VI, § 1 (conferringjurisdiction on the Virginia Supreme Court in
cases raising state or federal constitutional questions); see also Schapiro, supra note 227, at
429 (discussing textual support for judicial review under state constitutions).
258 See, e.g., R-I. CONSr. art I, § 24.
259
Id.
260 See State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (RI. 1980) (stating that departures from
federal doctrine "should be made guardedly"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Werner,
615 A.2d 1010 (RI. 1992); see also In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Appointed
Counsel), 666 A.2d 813, 816-18 (RI. 1995) (conforming the right-to-counsel provision of
the Rhode Island Constitution to federal Sixth Amendment jurisprudence); Werner, 615
A.2d at 1013-14 (conforming the unreasonable search-and-seizure provision of the Rhode
Island Constitution to federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Institutional Competence

Another approach to the deference issue focuses on the comparative expertise of the various branches of government. Under this
theory, a court should defer when another branch enjoys a relative
advantage in interpretation.2 6 1 Deriving the appropriate metric for
this assessment, however, presents insuperable difficulties. Judgments
as to relative competence must depend more on underlying normative commitments than on any readily definable institutional
characteristics.
On one level, the institutional competence theory suggests no judicial deference to other branches. After all, the Judiciary is especially
well suited to decide legal questions. Judicial expertise in legal interpretation provided one of the early arguments for judicial review
under the U.S. Constitution. In Marbuy v. Madison, ChiefJustice Marshall asserted that the Constitution was a species of law and that "[i] t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is."262 Along similar lines, Alexander Hamilton argued
that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts." 263 This judicial expertise indicates thatjudges are
especially skilled at constitutional interpretation and should not yield
264
to the interpretation of others.
Scholars have also pointed to the courts' structural independence
as a comparative advantage in constitutional interpretation. Life tenure may make federal judges less subject to political pressures that
might interfere with their constitutional judgment. 265 Additionally,
the adjudicative process itself may facilitate a fully considered resolution of constitutional disputes. 26 6 While generally favoring nondeferential review, the institutional expertise approach does suggest
deference when constitutional decisions turn largely on factual quesSee, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 32, at 1300 ("Ajudge ... has an obligation to
261
defer to the constitutional views of other actors if, but only if, those other actors are more
likely than the judge to discover the correct answer."); MichaelJ. Perry, The Constitution, the
Courts, and the Question of Minimalism, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 84, 147 (1993) (asserting that
preference for a particular standard of review "depends at least partly on whether and to
what extent one believes that, in general, ourjudges andJustices have a better capacity for
sound political-moral judgment than, in general, do our legislators").
262 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
263 THE FEDERAiiST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmore Kendall & George
W. Carey eds., 1966).
Cf Paulsen, supra note 23, at 335 ("Law interpretation is what courts do for a living.
264
They are supposed to be good at it.").
265 See Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, JudicialAuthority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on ConstitutionalInterpretationand the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 137, 148
(1993); Strauss, supra note 29, at 132; Richard A. Posner, Appeal and Consent Nmv REPUBuc, Aug. 16, 1999, at 36, 38 (book review) (discussing institutional advantages of the
Judiciary).
266 See Rosenfeld, supra note 265, at 148.
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tions. Because Congress has the institutional capacity to assess the
complex factors underlying whether an activity has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, for example, the Court should defer to con2 67
gressional conclusions as to the scope of the commerce power.
A version of the institutional competence approach underlies the
political-safeguards-of-federalism argument recognized in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.2 68 Because the states are

represented in Congress, this argument holds, Congress is in a very
good position to acknowledge and to weigh appropriately the state
interests that may be infringed by particular legislation. 269 Accordingly, the courts should not second-guess, but rather should defer to,
congressional determinations in matters of federalism. As a descriptive matter, it is now quite clear that the Court does not trust Congress
to make these decisions. For the Court, federalism is too important to
270
leave for someone else to defend.
In the administrative realm, the notion of relative administrative
271
expertise in gathering facts underlay early theories of deference.
The doctrine of administrative deference, however, applies not only to
agencies' fact-finding, but also to their legal interpretations. 272 Moreover, the Chevron doctrine moves away from focusing on administrative expertise, 273 instead tying deference to the clarity of the statute,
not the comparative advantage of the agency. Chevron apparently requires judicial deference if, but only if, the statute does not clearly
resolve the question at issue. 274 The difficulties in assessing the relative expertise of agencies and courts provided part of the impetus to
substitute the Chevron standard for a multifactor approach to
275
deference.
267 Similarly, legislative expertise in making means-end assessments and balancing
costs and benefits would suggest minimal judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses for Congress's economic and social policies.
268 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
269 See id.
270 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[T] he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too
vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other
level of Government has tipped the scales too far."). It is probably true that some supporters of the political safeguards argument do not put a particularly high value on federalism.
See, e.g, JEssE H. CHOPER, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND TE NATIONAL PoLrIcAL PRocEss 253
(1980) ("That personal liberty is neither dependent on nor enhanced by federalism has
been substantiated by experience in other countries as well.").
271 See Merrill, JudicialDeferenc4 supra note 149, at 994.
272 See id. at 994-95.
273
See id.; Monaghan, supra note 42, at 25-26.
274 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
275 See Merrill, JudicialDeference, supra note 149, at 994-95.
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A more general problem with the institutional competence theory is the difficulty of evaluating relevant institutional capabilities. Is
the Court or Congress better equipped to decide whether conduct
substantially affects interstate commerce? On the one hand, Congress
can draw on a broad array of social scientific evidence; Congress can
commission studies and hold hearings. Unlike the Court, Congress is
not limited by the presentation of the parties to a particular controversy. All these features suggest that the Court should defer to congressional determinations. On the other hand, when it comes to the
scope of congressional power, perhaps Congress is too biased to make
proper judgments. Perhaps national politicians, tempted by special
interest dollars, are too willing to aggrandize their own authority.2 7 6
Maybe the institutional position of the more insulated court system
affords it a better perspective on the question. Sorting out these contrary considerations requires a weighing of the relative risks and benefits of national power and federalism. General principles of
institutional competence provide only limited assistance.
In other areas as well, the scale used to measure competence depends on an assessment of the substantive interests involved and the
gravity of the risks associated with various kinds of miscalculations.
Part V argues that comparative institutional analysis should play a key
role in determining the appropriate level ofjudicial deference to constitutional interpretations by other government branches. This analysis, though, must reflect the substantive goals to be achieved in a
particular situation, not merely generalizations about the relative
2 77
strengths of the various branches of government.
C.

Promoting Democratic Deliberation

The goal of promoting democratic deliberation provides another
perspective on the deference question. James Bradley Thayer himself
relied principally on this ground when he advanced his influential
theory of judicial deference. Some contemporary scholars have embraced this approach, and related strains can be found in recent
Supreme Court opinions.
Following Alexander Bickel, much recent scholarship focuses on
judicial review as a countermajoritarian institution that is a potential
276 See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government ofLimited and EnumeratedPowers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MicH. L. REv. 752, 790-99 (1995) (criticizing the idea that Congress, rather than the Judiciary, can be the primary guardian of federalism); William T.
Mayton, "The Fate of Lesser Voices": Calhoun v. Wechsler on Federalism,32 WAxE FoREST L. Rzv.
1083, 1106-16 (1997) (same).
277 In advancing his own model of comparative institutional analysis, Neil Komesar
provides an insightful critique of the flaws in several other theories of constitutional adjudication that rely on assumptions of comparative institutional competence. See NEIL K.
KohwssAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATrvES 196-270 (1994).
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threat to democratic rule. 278 Although Thayer, too, warned of the

dangers that judicial review presents, his critique of judicial review
rested on quite different bases. Thayer did not emphasize
countermajoritarian fears of an unelected Judiciary imposing its will
on the populace. 279 Instead, Thayer premised his thoughts on the
limited nature ofjudicial power. Congress, Thayer asserted, inevitably
made constitutional decisions, not all of which would be judicially reviewable.28 0 For this reason, the Legislature, rather than the courts,
functioned as the chief protector of the people against unconstitutional laws. By denying judges a roving commission to root out unconstitutional acts-the kind of power that would have been
embodied in a Council of Revision-the Framers denied courts the
28
capacity to function as the primary protector of the Constitution. '
The people must rely on the constitutional judgments of the Legislature. 28 2 The question for Thayer was, given the limited scope ofjudicial power, how could the Judiciary exercise its authority so as best to
promote a sense of constitutional responsibility outside of the
courts.

28 3

Aggressive judicial review, Thayer argued, saps the vitality from
constitutional debate in the Legislature. 28 4 Nondeferentialjudicial review leads to a kind of democratic debilitation, in which the Legislature and the people lose the ability to engage in informed discourse
about constitutional norms. 28 5 Thayer labored under no illusions
about the actual course of legislative deliberations. He referred to
"persons ... who are such as we often see, in point of fact, in our
legislative bodies, persons untaught it may be, indocile, thoughtless,
278 Bickel's concise elaboration of the countermajoritarian problem is oft-quoted, and
deservedly so:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in
our system. . . . [WJhen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That, without
mystic overtones, is what actually happens.
BicKEL, supra note 59, at 16-17. Because of this countermajoritarian problem, Bickel characterized judicial review as a "deviant institution in the American democracy." Id. at 18.
279 See KAHS, supranote 59, at 85; Matthew D. Adler, JudicialRestraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 145 U. PA. L. Rxv. 759, 848-49 (1997)
(analyzing Thayer's theory of restraint and distinguishing it from arguments based on the

"Countermajoritarian Difficulty").
280

281
282

See Thayer, supra note 56, at 136-38.

See id. at 136-37 & n.1.
See id. at 135-36.
283 See id. at 155-56.
284
See id
285 See id.;
see also Mark Tushnet, PolicyDistortionand DemocraticDebilitation:Comparative
Illumination of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 245, 299-300 (1995) (discussing Thayer's critique of nondeferential judicial review).
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reckless, incompetent." 28 6 Thayer advocated a deferential standard
not out of respect for a supposedly enlightened legislature, but to
help strengthen a potentially careless one. Deferential judicial review
served an educative function, helping the Legislature and the people
to develop a sense of constitutional responsibility. 28 7 Following
Thayer, some contemporary scholars have shown sympathy for the
theory that aggressive judicial review may impair democratic delibera288
tion about important constitutional values.
Because this approach to deference rests on a normative preference for deliberative democracy, this framework has greater resolving
power than theories based on text or institutional competence. The
purposive perspective provides greater guidance in analyzing particular applications of deference. The difficulty in actually correlating
deference and democratic deliberation, however, results in a certain
amount of indeterminacy in application. What if Thayer's hypothesis
that deferential judicial review promotes democratic deliberation
proves incorrect? Further, whatever the relationship between deference and the democratic process, why does this normative concern
trump all other constitutional considerations? Constitutions embody
many values, and a myopic focus on only one, no matter how important that value may be, interferes with the realization of other constitutional concerns.
Some evidence does exist to help evaluate Thayer's hypothesized
relationship between deferential review and democratic deliberation,
Thayer, supra note 56, at 149.
Thayer explained the point as follows:
[T]he exercise of (judicial review], even when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes
comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience,
and the moral education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors....
The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function, now
lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people,
and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.
JANMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (1901), rerintedinJAMEs BRADLEY THAwE, OLIVER
WENDELL HoLmEs, AND FELIX FRANKFURTER ONJOHN MARSHALL 3, 85-86 (Philip B. Kurland
ed., 1967); see KAHN, supranote 59, at 85; Edward A. Purcell,Jr., LearnedHand: TheJurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive 43 BuFF. L. REV. 873, 894 (1995) (book review) (contrasting the views of Thayer with those of later "progressive legal thinkers"); see also Adler,
supra note 279, at 848 (describing the "pedagogic" understanding of Thayer's argument
for restraint).
288
See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTrrTONALSM: RECONSTRUCrING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 290-318 (1994); Steven D. Smith, Moral Realism, PluralisticCommunity,
and theJudicialImposition ofPrinciple:A Comment on Perry,88 Nw. U. L.REv. 183, 192 (1993);
Tushnet, supra note 285, at 299-301; cf Thomas C. Grey, Thayer'sDoctrine: Notes on Its Origin,
Scope, and Present Implications, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 28, 39-40 (1993) (noting affinity between
Thayer's theory and the central themes of the recent revival of civic republican thought).
See generally TUSHNET, supra note 124 (arguing that less vigorous judicial review will not
necessarily lead to an impairment of constitutional rights).
286
287
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but the evidence is not favorable to Thayer. State legislatures have
operated for a long time without the burden of aggressive judicial review under state constitutions. No evidence indicates that state legis2 89
lators have grown especially sensitive to constitutional concerns.
Congress appears to have devoted more consistent attention to constitutional matters than have state legislatures. Indeed, it is the revived
interest of the state judiciary in enforcing provisions of state constitutions that has provoked responses from their legislatures.29 0 Michael
Perry has argued cogently that "our experience with the Supreme
Court in the modern period suggests that judicial review, rather than
deadening, can stir the polity's sense of moral responsibility."29 1 The
29 2
state experience supports Perry's assertion.
Indeed, contrary to Thayer's view that deference encourages legislatures to act responsibly, one could understand the Supreme
Court's recent turn against deference as an attempt to promote democratic deliberation about constitutional values. In the Commerce
Clause and federalism areas, the Court has professed a need to protect the democratic process, though at a different level of government
from that addressed by Thayer. The Court has asserted that vigorous
enforcement of limits on federal authority serves to empower the
democratic process in the states. The Court claims that Congress, in
overstepping its constitutional boundaries, has interfered with the
ability of the states to maintain well-functioning democratic polities.
In Lope for example, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the federal
Gun-Free School Zones Act interfered with the ability of the states to
289
Cf. Hershkoff, supra note 213, at 1176-79 (questioning whether, in the context of
constitutional rights to welfare, state legislatures enjoy greater institutional competence

than state courts).

290 See Douglas S. Reed, Twent,-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and
the Impact of the New JudicialFederalism, 32 L. & Soc'y REv. 175, 205-06 (1998) (discussing
how courts can influence legislative action in the context of state constitutional litigation
over school financing).
291
MICHA.ELJ. PERRY, THE CONSTrrIrIoN, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN Ricrs 19 (1982).
292 As discussed above, Thayer's fear ofjudicial review reflects a concern for impairing
responsible legislative deliberation, rather than a countermajoritarian objection. It is interesting to note, though, that state constitutional law presents an odd haven for ajudicial
deference grounded in democratic principles. The factors that produce the
countermajoritarian dilemma for federal judicial review, such as unelected life-tenured
judges and a constitution that proves difficult to amend, generally do not apply in the
context of statejudicial review. Most state judges are elected or subject to periodic retention elections. See 31 COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 13-35 (1996)
(describing methods for the selection and retention of state judges). See generally PollyJ.
Price, Selection of State Court Judges, in STATE JUDICIARIEs AND IMPARTIALT. JUDGrNG THE

JUDGES 9, 9-38 (Roger Clegg &James D. Miller eds., 1996) (analyzing different methods of
judicial selection). State constitutions are easily, and frequently, amended. See 31 COUNCIL
OF STATE Gov'TS, supra, at 5-9. If deference reflects countermajoritarian concerns, the
practices of state and federal courts are exactly reversed. State courts are both more democratically responsive and more deferential than federal courts.
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craft their own solutions to the problem of guns in schools. 293 More
directly, in its federalism cases, the Court has argued that by commandeering state functions, the federal government distorts the democratic process. The Court asserts that in forcing states to regulate
according to a federal plan, Congress blurs lines of accountability,
making it impossible for citizens to determine the proper democratic
outlet for their grievances.2 9 4 For democracy to function, under the
Court's reasoning, decision makers must take responsibility for their
actions; aggrieved citizens must know whether to direct their petitions
to Albany or to Washington.
The aspersions cast on the legislative process by recent judicial
decisions also might suggest a desire to promote appropriate deliberation. Both Lopez and F/oida Prepaid avow respect for congressional
judgments, but simultaneously assert that the flawed nature of the particular processes giving rise to the challenged statutes negates any presumption of deference. 295 One could argue that these decisions
demarcate a kind of neo-Thayerian project. According to this view,
the Court encourages democratic debate by invalidating laws that result from an absence of deliberation. The issue is not recognizing
comparative competence, but promoting constitutional responsibility.
The Court selectively strikes down laws to encourage Congress to take
its deliberations seriously. In this hypothesis, judicial review plays a
pedagogic role, but this educational theory differs from Thayer's.
The current Court promotes constitutional responsibility not by removing the safety net of judicial review, as Thayer would have it. Instead, the Court intervenes and disciplines Congress more directly in
order to force maintenance of high deliberative standards. 296 Ironically, the foregoing account, which this Article labels "neo-Thayerian,"
ends by turning Thayer on his head. To promote constitutional responsibility, the Court adopts a mode of judicial review that is decid297
edly more robust and less deferential.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581-83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992). See generally Erwin
Chemerinsky, Formalismand Functionalismin FederalismAnalysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959,
293
294

974 (1997) (discussing the democratic accountability argument in New York v. United
States).

295
See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2199, 2207-11 (1999); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
296
In the area of statutory construction, Jane Schacter has identified modem judicial
efforts to employ interpretive methodologies so as to prod Congress to fulfill its responsibilities. SeeJane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The ChangingStructure of Legitimacy in Statutoiy
Interpretation, 108 HItv. L. Rmv. 593, 636-46 (1995) (discussing the "disciplinarian" approach to statutory construction).
297 Whether Thayer himself would find that the challenged actions of Congress pass or
fail a deferential test presents a different question. The evidence is conflicting. In City of
Boerne v. Fores,for example, the Court cited with approval the restrictive reading of con-

gressional enforcement power pronounced by the Civil Rights Cases in 1883.

See City of
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It is by no means clear that the Court's jurisprudence stems from
concern for promoting democratic deliberation. Part II argues that
the nondeferential approach actually reflects a substantive commitment to limiting federal power. The possibility of understanding the
cases as deliberation-enhancing, however, illustrates the potential indeterminacy of basing a theory of deference on the goal of encouraging deliberative democracy.
A unitary focus on legislative deliberation also may interfere with
the realization of other constitutional values. In this regard, the range
of Thayer's deferential review presents substantial difficulty. Thayer
was most concerned that robust judicial review limited the ability of
Congress to address pressing social, economic, and perhaps racial
questions.2 98 He wrote before judicial battles had occurred over free
speech, 29 9 legislative apportionment, and other matters central to the
proper functioning of the democratic process. 0 0 Bickel, among
others, noted that Thayer's approach does not adequately address issues relating to individual rights. 30 1 The refusal of state courts to engage in independent interpretation of the individual rights provisions
of state constitutions and their resistance to enforcing remedies in areas such as school finance illustrate the unfortunate consequences of
30 2
a uniformly deferential posture.
Constitutions embody other values in addition to democratic deliberation, and a theory ofjudicial review attuned only to this concern
overlooks important constitutional principles. In particular, constituBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,524-25,532 (1997) (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883)). Thayer, by contrast, singled out the Civil Rights Casesfor attack. SeeJames Bradley
Thayer, Constitutionalityof Legislation: The Precise Questionfor a Cour NATION, Apr. 10, 1884,
at 314; see alsoHook, supra note 59, at 6 ("The American event most immediately related in
Thayer's 'idea' was the Supreme Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases.. . ."). Deference, however, does not mean abdication. Bickel, for example, has argued that in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court adopted a greater degree of deference than
Thayer could tolerate. See Alexander M. Bickel, The VotingRights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv.
79, 102 ("Katzenbach v. Morgan constitutes restraint, if not abdication, beyond the wildest
dreams of . . . James Bradley Thayer, and in fact beyond anything he intended to
recommend.").
298 See PERRY, supranote 291, at 175 n.58 (noting that Thayer wrote in the context of
disputes about scope of federal power, rather than disputes about human rights); Hook,
supra note 59, at 6 (noting the importance to Thayer of the Supreme Court's decision in
the Civil Rights Cases, which limited Congress's ability to enact civil rights legislation, and
suggesting the possibility that Thayer's "judicial deference preference was prompted by a
desire to preserve federal law protections for southern blacks").
299 See Mendelson, supra note 59, at 77.
300 Some of Thayer's followers found judicial deference inappropriate in these areas.
See id Other heirs of Thayer, such as Justice Frankfurter, often retained a deferential posture in these areas as well. See id. at 83; cf Purcell, supranote 287, at 894 (arguing that the

"progressives" that followed Thayer urged deference to other branches based on technical
expertise, not democratic accountability).
301
See Bicru, supra note 59, at 39; Zeppos, supra note 60, at 301.
302
See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
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tions generally entail a commitment to protect certain values from
current democratic processes. 30 3 From this perspective, the difference between the constitutional and administrative context becomes
particularly significant. Some courts and commentators have argued
that judicial deference to administrative agencies is best understood as
recognizing the superior democratic pedigree of the administrative
decision. 30 4 Whatever validity this argument for deference has in the
administrative context, the theory does not easily translate into the
realm of judicial review under constitutions. This approach ignores
important nonmajoritarian features of constitutionalism.
Judicial enforcement of federalism as a way of empowering local
democracy runs into additional problems. A fundamental question
remains: Why should the Court view the promotion of local democracy as justification for setting aside the democratic output of the national Legislature? The answer to this question must lie in a
substantive theory of federalism, not in any simple theory of majoritarianism. Similar difficulties burden a framework that requires judicial
deference only when the Legislature has deliberated to the courts'
satisfaction. Why do the courts have authority to police the legislative
process in this fashion?
This approach, moreover, entails a strong inertial bias. The Legislature can act only if it adheres to certain deliberative norms. On
the other hand, lack of deliberation giving rise to inaction will generally be unreviewable. By placing hurdles in the path of legislative action, the Court increases the likelihood that no legislation will take
30 5
effect. To the extent the constitution mandates legislative action,
the Court interferes with the ability of the Legislature to discharge its
responsibility. In the end, then, this approach to deference involves a
303
304

See Croley, supra note 241, at 699.
Writing for the majority in Chevron,Justice Stevens asserted:

While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices ....
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision,
fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy,
rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who have no
constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984); see also Michael Herz, Deference RunningRiot: SeparatingInterpretationand Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. LJ. 187, 188-89 (1992); Merrill, JudicialDeference, supranote 149,
at 978 ("In addition to its novel framework, Chevron also broke new ground by invoking
democratic theory as a basis for requiring deference to executive interpretations."); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: EmphasizingReasoned Decisionmakingin Reviewing Agency
Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEx. L. Rxv. 83, 97 (1994).
305
The concept that constitutions may mandate legislative action is discussed infra
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strong bias against legislative action. This bias returns us to a theory
of enumerated powers. Only a substantive commitment to limiting
governmental power can justify placing these burdens on legislative
activity. The next Part seeks to construct a theory of deference that
attends to substantive concerns without falling prey to the flaws of the
foundationalist approach currently manifested in state and federal
practice.
V
A SUBSTANTrvE THEORY OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Theories based on text, institutional competence, and democracy
all have attractive features. A cogent theory ofjudicial deference possesses elements of each. But none of the theories individually gives
sufficient guidance on the question ofjudicial deference. These inadequacies help explain why courts rely instead on fundamental distinctions between limited and plenary powers in determining whether to
defer to other branches. Deference questions require normative assessments of the relative risks of various sources of power, and basic
principles of constitutional theory can provide the necessary value
judgments. The premise of the enumerated powers theory is that the
authority of government is limited. Thus, the government may exercise only those powers specifically granted, and nondeferential judicial review helps to keep governmental power in check. The plenary
theory, on the other hand, posits a government with general powers
limited only in specific instances. Thus, deferential judicial review reflects the broad constitutional grant of authority. In each case, the
judiciary defers to other branches in accordance with the level of discretion that the constitution confers on them.
This Part argues that, while the current focus on enumerated versus plenary power may provide determinate guidance on issues ofjudicial deference, this foundationalist model oversimplifies our
constitutional traditions and produces flawed judicial rulings. This
Part then constructs a more contextual, substantive theory that ties
deference to normative theories of governmental authority, without
reifying concepts such as enumerated or plenary power. 30 6 This contextual theory provides guidance in assessing deference questions
while remaining consistent with underlying constitutional principles.
A.

The False Dualism of Foundationalist Theories

Grounding the standard for judicial review in larger postulates of
constitutional theory has some appeal. This approach recognizes the
306 See generally, e.g., Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 REs. L. & Soc'y 25
(1980) (discussing reification).
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importance of the deference question and seeks an overarching
framework that situates judicial review firmly within our constitutional
tradition. Such a foundationalist account, however, inevitably reifies
and distorts the underlying constitutional principles. Neither the federal nor the state constitutional traditions can be reduced to a single
political theory. The traditions have always contained many voices,
and these voices have changed over time.
1.

Plenary Power and Affirmative Obligations in State Constitutions

In emphasizing the plenary power of state legislatures, for example, state courts overlook the ways in which state constitutions channel
legislative power. In particular, state courts have ignored the implications of the individual rights provisions of state constitutions. These
guarantees, which manifest a distrust of unbridled legislative discretion, also define the character of the constitution. In addition, state
constitutions often establish affirmative obligations that the government must discharge, such as providing educational systems 3 07 or
guaranteeing public welfare. 30 8 As pointed out by commentators, including Professor Hershkoff, by adopting deferential standards of review, state courts ignore the ways in which state constitutions actually
mandate governmental action. 30 9 In instances in which the state constitution affirms positive rights, Hershkoff argues for a consequential
approach to judicial review. Under this approach, a court would ensure that the legislature is proceeding toward the constitutionally re3 10
quired goal, but would defer as to the means employed in so doing.
307

All state constitutions contain provisions dealing with public education. See Allen

W. Hubsch, 77w EmergingRight to Education Under State ConstitutionalLaw, 65 Tzau. L. REv.
1325, 1343-48 (1992) (listing education provisions in state constitutions); Molly McUsic,
The Use of Education Clauses in School FinanceReform Litigation, 28 HAR. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311
(1991). The Wisconsin Constitution, for example, states: "The legislature shall provide by
law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable." Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3. The New York Constitution declares: "The legislature shall
provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all
the children of this state may be educated." N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
308 See, e.g., N.Y. CONs?. art. XVII, § 1 ("The aid, care and support of the needy are
public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in
such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine.");
Hershkoff, supra note 213, at 1135 ("[Mlore than a dozen state constitutions provide explicit protections for the poor.").
309 See Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights
Claims: The Role of State Courtsin an Era ofPositive Government, 24 RuTGERS LJ. 1057, 1060-61,
1075-89 (1993); Hershkoff, supra note 213; Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State
Constitutions,67 FoaRIAm L. Rxv. 1403, 1409, 1412 (1999); cf Lee Hargrave, Ruminations:
Mandates in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974: How Did They Fare, 58 LA. L. Ray. 389, 410
(1998) (describing interpretative problems arising from provisions of state constitutions
that contain mandates that are not self-enforcing).
310 See Hershkoff, supranote 213, at 1184-86; see also Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 169, 178 (1983) (noting limitations to the
theory of the plenary power of state legislatures).
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Hershkoff's framework succeeds in crafting a theory of deference
that is sensitive to substantive concerns, while avoiding the false dichotomy of plenary versus enumerated powers. Provisions that mandate legislative action do not fit comfortably into either model. Such
measures simultaneously grant powers to the legislature and cabin the
exercise of legislative discretion. They manifest a kind of distrust for
the legislature, but in marked contrast to the theory of enumerated
powers, this distrust reflects fears of legislative inaction. The challenge
for courts is to formulate a level of deference that corresponds to the
complexities of constitutions that embody neither generalized fear of
governmental power nor generalized trust of governmental authority.
A more nuanced and contextualized framework that reflects the multiple theories of governmental power present in the particular constitution is required. Professor Hershkoff's approach represents one
response to these complexities in the state context. The next section
expands the critique of false dichotomy into the realm of federal constitutional law.
2.

Enumerated and CoordinatePowers in an Activist State

Affirmative obligations break down the distinction between plenary and enumerated powers and suggest the flaws in theories ofjudicial deference that draw exclusively from one of these polar positions.
The U.S. Constitution is often viewed as a document concerned with
limitations on government, rather than with positive obligations. 31'
Certainly, much in the Constitution does focus on restricting governmental power. An emphasis on limited power has allowed the federal
courts to develop a robust jurisprudence of rights. 312 Unlike the state

courts, federal courts have employed strong, nondeferential approaches in safeguarding individual liberties.
The Constitution, however, does more than curtail governmental
authority. It sometimes speaks in a language that empowers the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, for example, contemplates an active federal role in protecting individual rights; the courts
may have a significant part in enforcing federal rights, but the Amendment speaks to Congress as well.313 Section 5 of the Fourteenth
311
See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-97
(1989) (emphasizing a negative, rather than an affirmative, understanding of constitutional obligations).
312 Philip Bobbitt, in particular, has emphasized the power of constitutional arguments
based on the overall premise of limited governmental authority. See PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 20 (1991) ("The fundamental American constitutional ethos
is the idea of limited government, the presumption of which holds that all residual author-

ity remains in the private sphere.").
313
See AKHIL REED AmAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUGIION 175 n.*
(1998) ("[Mlany congressional architects of Reconstruction envisioned not only judicial
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Amendment highlights the congressional obligation. 314 As Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion asserted in City of Richmond v.JA. Croson
Co., "Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment."315 Indeed, section 5 is a specific manifestation of the
theory of constitutional coordinacy.
Coordinacy rejects the view that the Constitution is only what the
Court says it is. The theory affirms that the Constitution speaks to
Congress directly, not merely through the mediating interpretations
of the courts. A corollary is that when the Constitution issues a command, it is incumbent upon Congress as well as the Court to obey.
When the Fourteenth Amendment proclaims that a state shall not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,"3 16 it imposes a duty on both the federal Legislature and the federalJudiciary. As the coordinacy theory emphasizes, members of Con3 17
gress, as well as judges, take an oath "to support this Constitution."
This coordinate constitutional role gives Congress not just privileges
of interpretation, but duties of enforcement. Thus, Congress, as well
as the courts, must ensure that a state does not infringe liberty or
property without due process.
Like the affirmative commands of state constitutions, the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that the paradigm of enumerated
powers does not fully capture the position of Congress. A theory of
nondeference based on the postulate of enumerated power does not
correspond to constitutional reality because the Fourteenth Amendment reflects a fear of inaction by the federal government. The theory of constitutional coordinacy thus reminds us that in the federal
and state constitutional contexts, a singular, reductionist conception
of the Constitution does not sufficiently attend to the multiple strands
of our constitutional tradition.
The Fourteenth Amendment presents an easy case, but what
about Congress's more general commerce power? The Constitution
established a national government of enumerated powers.3 18 Yet, it
also granted that government certain broad powers. 319 In this area, as
enforcement of section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] but also-and perhaps more
centrally-congressional enforcement.").
314
See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
315
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (plurality opinion).
316 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
317
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
318 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government
is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.").
319
Writing for the Court in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
[Tihe sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:656

in many others, the Constitution contains many conflicting principles. 20 It is not monolithic. Nor is the Constitution static. Rather,
the constitutional tradition has evolved over time. As Bruce Ackerman in particular argues, the experiences of Reconstruction and the
New Deal have transformed the Constitution in fundamental ways. 32 1
The New Deal Court's rejection of Lochnerreflected in part a new
conception of the relationship between tyranny and governmental
power. The dislocations of the emerging national economy and the
trauma of the Great Depression demonstrated a need for government
intervention to address abuses of private power.3 22 These events
showed that tyranny might result from governmental inaction. 323 The
Commerce Clause jurisprudence developed in the wake of the New
Deal recognized the national government's obligation to intervene in
a broad range of social and economic issues. 324 A foundational commitment to the doctrine of enumerated powers entails a belief that
government action, rather than inaction, constitutes the greatest
confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to
perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.
Id. at 421.
320 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTIUTION 24-25
(1991) (warning against a "hyper-integrationist" reading of the Constitution).
321
See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 47-50, 119-22 (1991).
322 Cf. Sunstein, Agency Inaction, supra note 15, at 683 ("The rise of the modem regulatory state results in large part from an understanding that government 'inaction' is itself a
decision and may have serious adverse consequences for affected citizens.").
323

See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 12 & n.21, 29 (1956) (re-

ferring to James Madison's implied conception of tyranny as "every severe deprivation of
natural rights" and describing tyranny inflicted by private individuals); Susan Bandes, The
Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MxcH. L. REV. 2271, 2284 (1990) ("Government can
harm by its inaction and its inadequate action, as well as its direct action."); Griffin, supra
note 15, at 2130 ("[Alt the base of these New Deal electoral mandates lay a public belief
that the national government should be held accountable not only when it acts, but when
it fails to act .... ."); Sunstein, Constitutionalism,supra note 15, at 501-04 (describing the
New Deal critique of government inaction); cf Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 873, 902-19 (1987) (examining the question whether certain "Lochner-like
premises" should be rejected).
324 One can view the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as reflecting a
belief that the Commerce Clause is not solely a grant of discretion to Congress, but instead
embodies a substantive constitutional commitment to a national commercial market. Congress has broad discretion as to the kind of regulations to adopt, but if Congress fils to act,
the courts will take the lead in striking down state legislation that interferes with the free
flow of interstate commerce. The dormant Commerce Clause cases set a default level of
national intervention to protect interstate commerce in the event of congressional inaction. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW § 6-1, at 1027 (3d ed. 2000)
("The thrust of the Supreme Court's work in federal-state relations has been to locate the
inertia of government.., on the side of the centralizing impulses of nationhood and
union.").
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threat to the polity. The Great Depression, however, undermined that
construction of the doctrine of enumerated powers.
The Supreme Court, moreover, is not simply a receptor of constitutional tradition. Rather, the Court participates in defining the character of the polity. The Constitution began a process that included
various political structures, such as judicial review, and thus shaped
the evolving republic. In the current Court's perspective, limited government requires nondeferential judicial review. However, it is just as
true that nondeferential judicial review produces limited government.
The kind of government we have is a product of the kind of review
applied by the Judiciary. In this sense, the standard ofjudicial review
is constitutive. By adopting a more deferential standard for the review
of congressional power after 1937, the Court recognized and helped
to create the modem activist state.
B. Toward a Contextual Theory of Deference
Standards of review reflect a recognition of the problem of error. 25 When a reviewer offers a different assessment, the reviewer is
not necessarily correct.3 2 6 Deferential standards of review acknowledge the possibility of error. For God, all review is de novo. 3 27 For us,
different standards correspond to fears about the consequences of different kinds of mistakes. A theory of enumerated powers betrays distrust of government, and nondeferential review responds to that
perspective: better to err on the side of preventing questionable governmental action. A concept of plenary power, on the other hand,
manifests greater trust in governmental power, and deference is the
appropriate reaction: better to err on the side of permitting governmental action. Grounding a theory of deference in a constitutional
calculus of the relative dangers of potential errors makes sense. The
attempt to justify a standard of review solely by reference to fundamental principles of enumerated or plenary powers, however, overlooks the complexity of our constitutional traditions. In this area,
3

325 By using the term "error," I do not mean to imply an epistemic search for the one
true interpretation. Error may reflect instead a pragmatic assessment of the results of a
ruling, given the benefit of hindsight.
326 Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result)
("We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final.").
327 I refer here to the consequences of omniscience, not to divine qualities of mercy.
If the focus is instead on judging human actions, it would probably be true that all review
in Hell is de novo. Cf GRANT GxiLoRE, THE AGms oF AMERIcA LAw 111 (1977) ("In Hell
there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.").
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"first principles"3 28 do not offer much guidance. 329 Instead, we need
a more contextualized and pragmatic assessment of the place ofjudicial review.
In some areas, constitutions demonstrate great fear of governmental power. Bills of rights reflect such anxieties. For example,
when state courts engage in lockstep interpretation of state bill-ofrights provisions, thus denying the provisions independent operative
significance, they ignore important constitutional elements. First
principles of plenary power do not reflect the various strands in state
constitutions.
In other domains, constitutions recognize the problem of government inaction. Welfare and education provisions of state constitutions and the Fourteenth Amendment represent such calls to
governmental action. I have also argued that our constitutional tradition gives the modern Commerce Clause a similarly affirmative
caste. 33 0 In such realms, governmental inaction threatens constitutional values and deserves more rigorous judicial scrutiny.3 3 ' Contrary
to the recent judicial opinions, deferential review of the manner in
which Congress discharges these constitutional commands does not
belie a foundational commitment to limited national power. Instead,
it recognizes important activist strands in the Constitution that we
have. In cases such as Lopez and FloridaPrepaid, Congress sought to
discharge its affirmative obligations to regulate interstate commerce
and to protect constitutional rights. The legislation involved therein
did not infringe on any protected liberties. Accordingly, the Court
should have deferred to congressional judgments about the proper
way to achieve these goals. When the Court looks anew at congressional power to enact civil rights legislation, it should return to an
appropriately deferential stance.
Some issues present more difficult problems. The new federalism jurisprudence of cases such as New York v. United States and Printz
raises complex interpretive issues. Some approaches to the deference
question are clearly inadequate. The constitutional text provides little
guidance, 332 and arguments about comparative competence and promoting democracy are indeterminate. 333 As this Part has demon328
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("We start with first principles.
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.").
329

See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864,

887 (1986) ("[I] t would be dangerous to read too much, even at the theoretical level, into
the generally valid principle that ours... is a Constitution of negative rather than positive
liberties. At the practical level the distinction may be of even less significance.").
330 See supra notes 318-24 and accompanying text.
331
The Supreme Court, of course, has intervened quite vigorously to enforce the
Commerce Clause, see supra note 324, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment.
332
See supra text accompanying notes 245-56.
333
See supra Part IV.B-C.

2000]

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

strated, blanket references to a theory of enumerated federal power
are misleading.
The question then becomes how the risk of unduly restricting
congressional authority compares to the risk of violating constitutional principles of federalism. 334 To answer this question, one must
resort to contested principles of American constitutionalism. Unlike
cases that implicate the scope of the Commerce Clause, section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, affirmative duties to support education
or welfare, or protections of fundamental individual rights, the Constitution itself provides little direct guidance as to where the primary
fear of error lies. For the reasons stated by the dissents in those cases,
this Article contends that the "commandeering" of state government
functions effected in New York v. United States and Printz does not present a serious threat to principles of federalism. By contrast, the need
for national coordination to address screening of gun buyers and interstate disposal of low-level radioactive waste argues for a strong congressional role. The Supreme Court believed otherwise.
What each case requires is an assessment of the character of the
constitutional command and the consequences of various kinds of errors. In particular instances, these determinations may be subject to
dispute. This debate about constitutional purposes is salutary and
much more desirable than rote reference to concepts of enumerated
or plenary powers.
The contextual approach that this Article advocates builds on the
salutary features of other theories of deference. Like the enumerated/plenary power framework that this Part criticizes, the contextual
approach grounds a theory of deference in the constitutional conferral or restriction on governmental power. This normative framework
provides a focus for evaluating the comparative interpretive advantage
of the different branches of government. Rather than basing standards of review on abstract assessments of institutional competence,
the contextual approach looks to the constitution itself for guidance
in allocating decision-making authority. In determining the appropriate standard for judicial review, the approach relies on the constitution's judgments as to the relative risks of governmental action and
inaction. These constitutional judgments determine the appropriate
level of judicial deference.
Unlike the enumerated/plenary power framework, the contextual approach resists ascribing a single theory of governmental power
to a particular constitution. The contextual approach insists that constitutions contain many different elements, reflecting different fears
334
I do not mean to concede the validity of the federalism argument advanced in New
York v. United Statesand Printz. In performing the risk assessment underlying the deference
question, however, I assume that the risks identified by the Court are legitimate.
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and aspirations, and that these elements may shift over time. The insistence on evaluating each separate constitutional provision does
render the contextual approach less determinate than a framework
relying on the enumerated/plenary dichotomy. Indeed, any approach will be less determinate than the "always-defer" or "never-defer" principles that that dichotomy generates. As apparent from the
discussion of the Tenth Amendment cases, the particular outcome of
an inquiry into constitutional powers and limits may be open to dispute. In other instances, the result may be more clear cut. Unless
one indulges in pernicious oversimplifications, a greater level of precision may not be possible with regard to these kinds of constitutional
issues. The most one should expect is a theory that plausibly identifies the relevant values. The contextual approach, I believe, satisfies
that standard.
CONCLUSION

Recent federal court decisions manifest a marked decline in the
deference afforded constitutional judgments of other branches of government. These rulings, with their rhetoric of judicial supremacy,
stand in contrast both to the academic support for theories of coordinate interpretation and to the deferential review practiced in state
courts. Coordinacy allows for a theory ofjudicial deference, while the
historical practice of federal courts and the current practice of state
courts illustrate the possibility of such deferential review.
Although the standard ofjudicial review likely reflects many influences, the pattern of deference in the federal and state courts corresponds to judicial understandings of the fundamental postulates of
state and federal constitutions. Federal courts link nondeferential review to concepts of a federal government of enumerated and limited
powers, while state courts tie their deference to a notion of plenary
state governmental power. Standards of review properly reflect constitutional commitments and the relative dangers of different kinds of
interpretive errors. Reducing state or federal constitutions to singular
notions of enumerated or plenary powers, however, ignores the complexity and plasticity of constitutional traditions. The resulting theories of deference are rigid and untextured, leading federal courts to
thwart congressional efforts to realize constitutional values and enabling state courts to allow state legislatures to abdicate their constitutional responsibilities. A more pragmatic, contextual theory better
attends to the specific character of particular constitutional provisions
and calibrates deference accordingly. This theory allows sufficient leeway to legislatures to carry out their constitutional duties, while ensuring that their inaction does not undermine important constitutional
principles.

